Identity Theft in Cyberspace: Issues and Solutions by CHAWKI, Mohamed & Abdel Wahab, Mohamed
1CHAWKI and ABDEL WAHAB, Lex Electronica, vol. 11 n°1 (Printemps / Spring 2006)
Identity Theft in Cyberspace: Issues and Solutions
Judge Mohamed CHAWKI1 and Dr. Mohamed S. ABDEL WAHAB2
Lex Electronica, vol.11 n°1 (Printemps / Spring 2006)
http://www.lex-electronica.org/articles/v11-1/ chawki_abdel-wahab.htm
http://www.lex-electronica.org/articles/v11-1/ chawki_abdel-wahab.pdf
INTRODUTION............................................................................................................................................................ 2
PART I: CYBERSPACE IDENTITY THEFT: STATEMENT OF PROBLEM(S)............................................ 4
1- THE PROBLEM OF IDENTITY THEFT............................................................................................................ 4
2- IMPACT AND HARM GENERATED BY IDENTITY THEFT ....................................................................... 8
3- FACTORS FACILITATING IDENTITY THEFT ............................................................................................ 10
4- INFORMATION PRIVACY AND IDENTITY THEFT................................................................................... 11
5- INFORMATION ACCESSIBILITY AND MECHANISMS OF CYBERSPACE IDENTITY THEFT ........ 13
5-1 Cyber-Trespass or Hacking: ........................................................................................................................ 14
5-2 Phoney or Sham Websites: Phishing and Pharming................................................................................... 15
5-3 Spoofing ........................................................................................................................................................ 16
5-4 Spyware......................................................................................................................................................... 17
5-5 Electronic Bulletin Boards ........................................................................................................................... 17
5-6 Information Brokers ..................................................................................................................................... 18
5-7 Internet Public Records................................................................................................................................ 19
5-8 Malicious Applications: Trojan Horses....................................................................................................... 20
6- USING STOLEN IDENTITES........................................................................................................................... 20
PART II: CYBERSPACE IDENTITY THEFT PROPOSED SOLUTIONS ..................................................... 23
1- REGULATORY STRATEGIES AND LEGISLATIVE APPROACHES: A QUEST FOR GLOBAL
HARMONIZATION................................................................................................................................................ 23
1.1. National and Regional Strategies: The European Approach..................................................................... 23
1.2. Prosecuting Identity Theft under Federal Criminal Laws: American Approach...................................... 26
1.3. International Strategies: The Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime .......................................... 29
2- TECHNICAL APPROACHES ........................................................................................................................... 31
2.1. Minimizing Recurrences: Precautionary Guidelines ................................................................................. 31
2.2. Utilizing State-of-the-Art Technologies: ..................................................................................................... 33
3. DIGITAL SIGNATURES WITH PKI TECHNOLOGY.................................................................................................. 38
4. FUTURE TRENDS ................................................................................................................................................... 39
5. CULTURE-ORIENTED STRATEGY: PUBLIC AWARENESS AND TRAINING ON SECURITY ISSUES.......................... 40
CONCLUSION............................................................................................................................................................ 40
                                                 
1 (LL.B), (BA), (LL.M), (DU), (FRSA) is a “Junior Judge” at the Council of State (Conseil d’Etat), a Phd
Researcher in cyberlaw at the School of Law, University of Lyon III, France; an expert in cybercrime at the
International Scientific and Professional Advisory Council of the United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal
Justice Programme (ISPAC); a fellow of the Royal Society of Arts in the United Kingdom (FRSA) and a
member of Cybercrime Institute in France. Mohamed Chawki has taught part-time on Cybercrime and Cyberlaw
for the LL.M English programme at the ITI Institute. He has authored many articles in English and French
journals and conference papers. He is recipient of numerous academic prizes and the Medal of Excellence.
Email: mohamed_chawki@hotmail.com
2 Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law Cairo University; Vice-Chairman, Chartered Institute of Arbitrators
(Cairo Branch); Legal Counsellor and Expert, Information Technology Industry Development Agency (Egypt);
Member of the United Nations Expert Group on Online Dispute Resolution; Fellow of the Centre for
Information Technology and Dispute Resolution, University of Massachusetts, USA; Of Counsel, Shalakany
Law Office, Egypt.
Email: mohamed_wahab@hotmail.com
2CHAWKI and ABDEL WAHAB, Lex Electronica, vol. 11 n°1 (Printemps / Spring 2006)
“He That Filches From Me My Good Name
Robs Me Of  That Which Enriches Him, And
Makes Me Poor Indeed”
- Shakespeare, Othello (3.3180-86)
INTRODUTION
Identity theft3 occurs when someone uses or exploits the personal identifying
information4 of another person such as: name, social security number, mother’s
maiden name, ID number, etc…to commit fraud5 or engage in other unlawful
                                                 
3 The term “identity” is commonly used arbitrarily and imprecisely in popular media and literature and the terms
“identity theft” and “identity crime” are frequently used interchangeably. Occasional misusers are not surprising
because in the contemporary context, the traditional meaning underlying those concepts have become
increasingly known as information and information technology (IT). The Oxford English Dictionary defines
“identity” as “the set of behavioral or personal characteristics by which an individual is recognised”. The
traditional use of the word “identity” spoke to one’s name, familial membership and occupation. The
contemporary meaning of “identity” has, however, assumed a candidly IT connotation that extends traditional
meanings to include such things as one’s consumer and credit histories, financial accounts, and Social security
number. It is this contemporary usage of “identity” that is at issue when it comes to conceptualizing identity theft.
See J. COLLINS, Preventing Identity Theft Into Your Business (New Jersey, John Wiley), [2005], p. 7.
4 According to the American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, information is “knowledge of
specific events or situations that has been gathered or received by communication, intelligence, or news”.
5 Considerations of the topic of computer fraud raises three major questions: What is it? How extensive is it? Is it
illegal? In common with most aspects of the topic, definitional problems abound. In the United Kingdom, the
Audit Commission has conducted four triennial surveys of computer-related fraud based on a definition referring
to: ‘any fraudulent behaviour connected with computerisation by which someone intends to gain financial
advantage’. Such a definition is capable of encompassing a vast range of activities some of which may have only
the most tenuous connection with a computer. The Council of Europe, in its report on computer-related crime
advocates the establishment of an offence consisting of: “The input, alteration, erasure or suppression of
computer data or computer programmes [sic], or other interference with the course of data processing, that
influences the result of data processing thereby causing economic loss or possessor loss of property of another
person, or with the intent of procuring an unlawful economic gain for himself or for another person”. However
this definition is broad in scope. It would appear for example that the proposed offence would be committed by a
person who wrongfully uses another party’s cash dispensing card to withdraw funds from a bank account.
Although there can be little doubt about the criminality of such conduct, the involvement of the computer is
purely incidental.  In most areas of traditional legal interests, the involvement of computer data does not cause
specific legal problems. The respective legal provisions are formulated in terms of results and it is completely
irrelevant if this result is achieved with the involvement of a computer or not. However, even in this area
computer-specific qualifications are proposed in some countries. When examining the field of financial
manipulations, the situation will be different: Many countries require that the offender take an “item of another
person's property”. The statutory provisions are not applicable if the perpetrator appropriates deposit money. In
many legal systems, these traditional provisions also cause difficulties, as far as manipulations of cash dispensers
are concerned. The statutory provisions of fraud in most legal systems demand a deception of a person. They
cannot be used when a computer is “cheated”. The statutory definitions of breach of trust or “abus de confiance”
which exist in several countries – such as in Belgium, Germany, Japan, France, or Switzerland – only apply to
offenders in high positions and not to punchers, operators or programmers; some provisions also have
restrictions concerning the protected objects. On such a basis, many European countries looked for solutions de
lege lata which did avoid stretching the wording of already existing provisions too much. Laws on ICTs fraud
have been enacted in Australia, Austria, Denmark, Greece, Germany, Finland, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden,
Norway, Spain, and the USA. Similar reform proposals are being discussed in the United Kingdom while others
are already discussing amending and tightening the existing rules. Moreover, the Swedish legislature expanded
the provisions on breach of trust to technicians in qualified positions of trust.
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activities.6 Whilst numerous variations of this crime exist, an identity thief can
fraudulently use personal identifying information for any of the following purposes: (a)
opening new credit card accounts;7 (b) taking over existing credit card account(s) ; (c)
applying for loans; (d) renting apartments; (e) contracting with utility companies; (f)
issuing fraudulent checks using another person’s name and account number; (g)
stealing and transfering money from existing bank accounts; (h) instituting bankruptcy
proceedings; and/or (i) obtaining employment using a victim’s name and details.8
On such account, identity theft is a serious crime that merits due consideration and
adequate prevention and combating.9 Identity theft may be committed in whole or in
part by the use of information and communication technologies (ICTs), which
dispenses with face- to- face physical  contact  and al lows for  d istant
encounters.
Historically, fraud involved face-to-face communication since physical contact was
primarily the norm.10 Even when remote communication—i.e., snail mail—could be
used to set up a fraudulent transaction, it was often still necessary for the parties  to
meet  and  consummate  the crime with a physical transfer of  the tangible property
obtained by deceit.11
Nevertheless, the proliferation of ICTs has exerted a profound impact upon the nature
and form of crime, and has altered the mechanisms of crime commission. Nowadays,
perpetrators can use fraudulent e-mails and fake websites to scam thousands of
victims located around the globe, and may expend less effort in doing so than
their predecessors.12 These new forms or genera of automated or electronic crime
distinguishes online virtual fraud13 from real-world fraud in at least two important
respects: (a) it is far more difficult for law enforcement officers to identify and
apprehend online fraudsters; and (b) these offenders can commit crimes on a far
broader scale than their real-world counterparts.14
                                                 
6 See J. MAY, Preventing Identity Theft (N.Y., Security Resources Unlimited), [2004], p. 2.
7 Credit card fraud consists of the unauthorized use of a regularly issued or cloned credit card. See, e.g.,
Consumer Action, Preventing Credit Card Fraud, at: <http://www.consumer-action.org/English/library/
credit_cards/2000_PreventingCreditFraud/index.php>
(last accessed Sept. 27, 2004); BBC News,  Credit Card Cloning (July 12, 2004), at:
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/insideout/east/series3/credit_card_cloning.shtml> (last accessed Sept. 27, 2004).
8 This type of fraud is known either as 4-1-9 fraud or “advance fee fraud.” See, e.g., U.S. Secret Service, Public
Awareness Advisory Regarding “4-1-9” or “Advance Fee Fraud” Schemes,  at
<http://www.secretservice.gov/alert419.shtml> (last accessed Sept. 27, 2004). The “4-1-9” reference derives
from the fact that these scams often originate in, or are presented as originating in, Nigeria; “4-1-9” is the
section of the Nigerian penal code that addresses fraud. In advance fee fraud scams, the target is convinced
to part with substantial sums of money, which are characterized as advance fees the payment of which will result
in the victim’s sharing in a substantial sum of money, usually in the millions.
9 See D. PARKER, Fighting Computer Crime (N.Y., Wiley), [1998].
10 See S. BRENNER, Cybercrime Metrics: Old Wine, New Bottles (Virginia, Virginia Journal of Law and
Technology), [2004], p. 6.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 See, e.g., Federal Bureau of Investigation & National White Collar Crime Center, IFCC 2002 Internet Fraud
Report 3, at <http://www1.ifccfbi.gov/strategy/2002_IFCCReport.pdf.>  Another common type of fraud is non-
delivery of merchandise and payment.  See id.  For other types of online fraud, see Internet Fraud Watch,
Internet Fraud Tips, at <http://www.fraud.org/internet/inttip/inttip.htm> (last accessed Sept. 18, 2004).
14 Ibid.
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People whose identities have been stolen can spend months or years and thousands
of dollars cleaning up the mess generated by the thieves’ exploitation of a good name
and credit record.
On a different note, being an identity theft victim can lead to a variety of problems
including: (a) being hassled by creditors demanding payments on balances they do
not owe15; (b) ending up with a ruined credit report16; (c) being unable to secure a job,
rent an apartment, buy a car or obtain loans17; (d) being arrested for crimes the victim
did not commit; and (e) finally the cost to law enforcement is not inexpensive, as it
could cost between $ 15,000 to $ 25,000 to investigate each case.18
PART I: CYBERSPACE IDENTITY THEFT: STATEMENT OF
PROBLEM(S)
I first was notified that someone had used my Social
Security number for their taxes in February 2004. I also
found out that this person opened a checking account,
cable and utility accounts, and a cell phone account in my
name. I'm still trying to clear up everything and just
received my income tax refund after waiting four to five
months. Trying to work and get all this cleared up is very
stressful.
A  consumer’s complaint to the FTC, July 9, 2004
1- THE PROBLEM OF IDENTITY THEFT
Identity theft is a major problem and a vexing threat. It takes diverse forms and
degrees ranging from simple unauthorized use of a credit card to complete takeover
of a person’s identity.19 Furthermore, law enforcement officers find it difficult to
                                                 
15 See J. PETRO, Identity Theft  ( Ohio), available at :
<http://www.ag.state.oh.us/online_publications/consumer_protection/id_theft_lesson.pdf#search='%EF%83%98
%20Being%20hassled%20by%20creditors%20demanding%20payments%20on%20balances%20they%20do%2
0not%20owe.'> (visited 01/10/2005).
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Identity Theft Resource Center [2003].
19 Most experts believe that common forms of computer related crime are significantly underreported because
‘victims may not realize that they have been victimized, may not realize that the conduct involved in a crime, or
may decide not to complain for reasons of embarrassment or corporate credibility’. Other reasons for the under-
reporting of cybercrime are that ‘Further problems arise with the mass victimization caused by offences such as
virus propagation, because the number of victims are simply too large to identify and count, and because such
programs can continue creating new victims long after the offenders have been caught and punished’. Finally, a
factor complicating the gathering and comparison of  national crime statistics will be the fact that transnational
computer related crimes are, by definition committed in or have effects in at least two States risking multiple
reporting or no reporting at all. Thus, much of the information we have on cybercrimes is the product of studies
and surveys addressed to individuals working in information security. On such a basis the obvious problem that
survey results include only the respondents of people who agreed to participate. Before basing critical decisions
on survey information, it is important to find out what the response rate was; although there are no absolutes, in
general we aim to trust survey results more when the response rate is high.  However, response rates for
telephone surveys are often less than 10%; response rates for mail and e-mail surveys can be less than 1%. It is
not easy to make any case for random sampling under such circumstances, and all results from such low-
response-rate surveys should be viewed as indicating the range of problems or experiences of the respondents
rather than as indicators of population statistics.
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identify and apprehend online Identity thiefs. This may be due to the fact that they can
use technology to conceal their identities and physical location, thereby frustrating
law enforcement efforts to locate them.
The traditional model of law enforcement assumes t ha t  the commission of an
offence involves physical proximity between perpetrator and victim.20 This
assumption has shaped our approaches to criminal investigation and prosecution.
Real-world criminal investigations focus on the crime scene as the best way to
identify a perpetrator and link him to the crime. However, in automated or
cybercrime21 there may either be no crime scene or there may be many crime
scenes, with shredded evidence of the crime is scattered throughout cyberspace.22
Accordingly, identifying an electronic crime scene can be a daunting task when the
perpetrator may have routed his communications with the victim through
computers in three or four countries, with obscure networks that are inaccessible
to investigators. Additionally, perpetrators could make things much more difficult and
complicated by using technology and encryption techniques that provide a high-
level of anonymity or assuming the identity of an innocent person. Moreover, the
scale of online identity theft can exceed that of real-world crime in terms of the
degree of harm23 inflicted by a single crime24.
                                                 
20 See S. BRENNER, op. cit. p. 6.
21 Donn PARKER, who has been studying computer crime since the 1960s, believes we will see the
emergence of  totally automated crimes, which are available for purchase. See Donn PARKER, Automated
Crime, WindowSecurity.com [2002], at <http://secinf.net/misc/Automated_Crime_.html> (last modified Oct.
16, 2002).
22 Ibid.
23 The principle that the only justification for criminalizing conduct is to prevent harm is traceable in the writings
of John Stuart Mill.  In On Liberty, Mill declared that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually
or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is self-protection. That the only
purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his
will, is to prevent harm to others. J O  L  9 (1859).  The position Mill takes in this passage, of
course, can only be used to justify the articulation of crimes against persons and crimes against property, for only
these crimes directly inflict harm upon others.  In the years after the appearance of On Liberty, Mills and later
scholars expanded the principle so it now reaches a wide variety of harms. See, e.g., E.BERNARD, The Collapse
of the Harm Principle, 90 (J. CRIM. L. & Criminology) 109, 120-39 [1999]. See also J. HALL, General
Principals in Criminal Law 213-22 (1960).  The nature of the harm encompassed by a criminal prohibition is not
relevant to the issues under consideration in this article; the issue addressed in the section immediately above is
whether or not the varieties of conduct that are currently, and casually, described as cybercrime result in the
infliction of socially-intolerable harms that are distinct from those addressed by the repertoire of crimes
respectively found in contemporary human societies.
24 There have been surveys of the incidence and effects of cybercrime on business. See, e.g., U.S. Department
of Justice – Bureau of Justice Statistics, Cybercrime Against Businesses  [2004] at :
<http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cb.pdf> (last visited Sept. 27, 2004); Computer Security Institute, Ninth
Annual CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey [2004] at :
<http://www.gocsi.com/forms/fbi/pdf.jhtml> (last visited Sept. 27, 2004) [Hereinafter CSI/FBI Survey];
Australian CERT, 2004 Australian Computer Crime and Security Survey, at <http://www.auscert.org.au/
render.html?it=2001&cid=1920> (last  visited Sept.  18, 2004). These surveys generally do not differentiate
between crime and cybercrime as legal phenomena. The question used in the Bureau of Criminal Justice
Statistics’ 2001 survey of cybercrime against businesses, for example, asked about the following categories
of security threats: embezzlement; fraud theft of proprietary information; denial of service; vandalism or
sabotage (electronic); computer virus, other intrusion or breach of computer systems, misuse of computers by
employees, unlicensed use of copying of digital products developed for  resale, and other.
See U.S. Department of Justice – Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2001 Computer Security Survey 1, at
<http://www.census.gov/eos/www/css/cssprimary.pdf> (last visited Sept. 27, 2004). The same agency’s survey
of  cybercrime cases handled by state prosecutors audited the  following issues: credit card  fraud,  bank card
fraud, computer  forgery, computer sabotage, unauthorized access to computer, unauthorized copying or
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For example, with respect to bank robbery in the United States, the “average
amount netted from an individual [real-world] bank robbery is less than $8,000.”25
While bank robbery is of common occurrence, the scale of the harm resulting from
each incident is small. Compare this with an incident that occurred in 1995 when
Russian hacker Vladimir Levin and his associates transferred $12 million
surreptitiously, and illegally, from Citibank customer accounts.26. The $12 million was
transferred in increments, each of which exceeded the $8,000 average by far.
Despite being ancient, the Levin incident reveals that in cyberspace single attacks,
single crimes, could inflict harm of greater magnitude compared to the real world.
The Levin incident is equally a clear demonstration of potential external threat, as
ICTs render physical barriers and national borders irrelevant, wealthy countries will
find themselves increasingly the object of undesired attention from hackers.27 The
notorious bank robber Willie Sutton allegedly said, when asked why he robbed
banks, “because that’s where the money is.” The same can be said for online
identity theft crime, especially financially motivated crime. Individuals and entities
in wealthier countries are the source of wealth, and therefore present tempting
targets for online criminals. Thus, territorial-based strategies tend not to be effective
against online identity theft crime because they are designed to prevent the
citizens of one nation-state from preying on each other, not to prevent their preying
on citizens of other nation-states.28
In this respect, Marc GOODMAN has succinctly stated:
[L]aw has evolved to maintain order within a society. Each nation-state is
concerned with fulfilling its obligations to its citizens…[N]o nation can survive if
its citizens are free to prey upon each other. But what if they prey upon
citizens of another society? What if the citizens of Nation A use cyberspace to
prey upon the citizens of Nations B and C? Is this a matter that is likely to be
of great concern to Nation A? There are historical precedents for this type of
behavior that may shed some light on what will ensue in cyberspace. The
most analogous involves high-seas piracy and intellectual piracy. Both
involved instances in which societies were willing to allow (or even encourage)
their citizens to steal from citizens of other societies. In both, the focus was
on crimes against property the motivation was purely economic. [T]he conduct
took place at the ‘margins’ of the law: high-seas piracy occurred outside the
territorial boundaries of any nation and therefore outside the scope of any
laws; eighteenth-century American intellectual property piracy 29occurred
                                                                                                                                                         
distribution of computer programs, cyberstalking, theft of  intellectual property,  transmitting child pornography,
and identity  theft. The CSI/FBI Computer Crime survey focused on these issues: virus insider abuse of net
access, laptop/mobile theft, unauthorized access to information, system penetration, denial of service, theft of
proprietary information, sabotage, financial fraud, telecom fraud. CSI/FBI Survey, as § II explains, these
categories do not represent increments of a new type of criminal activity: cybercrime. Instead, they represent the
use of computer technology to commit traditional offenses: crime. Section II considers whether the use of
computer technology to commit crimes differs from traditional criminal activity in ways that justify treating it
differently for purposes of legal analysis and/or tracking its incidence and effects.
25 See L. LESSIG, Code and other Laws of Cyberspace 33 [1999] (Whereas real space requires that you
reveal “your sex, your age, how you look, what language you speak, whether you can see, whether you can
hear, [and] how intelligent you are,” cyberspace requires only that you reveal your computer address.).
26 See S. BRENNER, op. cit. p. 19.
27 Id.
28 See S. BRENNER, op. cit. p. 19.
29 In 2002, Rep. Howard Berman   introduced the Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention Act (2002), which would have
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when the legal status of intellectual property as ‘property’ was still evolving.
Both were outlawed when they became economically disadvantageous for the
host countries. One can, therefore, hypothesize that countries may be
inclined to tolerate their citizens’ victimizing citizens of other nations if (a) the
conduct takes place at the margins of the law and (b) results in a benefit to
the victimizing nation. The former gives the victimizing nation plausible
deniability when confronted with its tolerance of illegal activity; the latter is an
obvious motive for tolerating the activity. 30   
Unlike real-world crime, which inflicts harm of various types upon discrete victims,
online identity theft can inflict both individual harm and systemic harm. Cyberspace
and ICTs have become an essential part of the national critical infrastructures31.
While identity theft harms individual victims, it is not limited to that; as the National
Strategy to Secure Cyberspace rightfully noted, online identity theft can undermine
or even destroy a nation’s critical infrastructure. This makes it a far more pressing
threat than traditional, real-world crime; in a sense, online identity theft erodes the
distinction between internal and external threats.
In a world of physical and territorial barriers, societies divide threats into external and
internal and allocate the responsibility for dealing with each to respective social
institutions. whilst we will always need institutions to  deal with traditional forms of
real-world threats, nonetheless, we would certainly need a strategy to deal with
threats that come from cyberspace or the virtual world. In devising that strategy,
we should revist and consider the adequacy and feasibil ity of the classical
and traditional nomenclature of internal and external threats.32
Finally, online identity theft does carry the seeds of a potential conflict between
national legal systems due to the intrinsic transnational and cross-border implications
of such crimes, and the relative variation and divergence of national and regional
                                                                                                                                                         
protected  copyright owners  who engaged in  acts of self-help to protect their works, H.R. 5211, 107th Cong.
(2002), 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030; see also H. BERMAN, The Truth About the Peer to Peer Piracy Prevention Act:
Why Copyright Owner Self-help Must Be Part of  the P2P Piracy Solution, available at
<http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20021001_berman.html>. During the summer of 2003, Senator
Orrin Hatch proposed destroying the computers of individuals who illegally download material, pointing out
that damaging someone’s computer “may be the only way you can teach somebody about copyrights.”
Senator Takes Aim at Illegal Downloads, AP ONLINE, June 18, 2003 (on file with the Yale Journal of Law
and Technology).  Representative John Carter (R-TX) also suggested that jailing college students for piracy
would deter other infringers. Katie Dean, Marking File Traders as Felons, WIRED    NEWS, Mar. 19, 2003,
< http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,58081,00.html> In 2004, Congress considered the Inducing
Infringement of Copyright Act of 2004, which aimed to hold software creators liable for the infringing activities
of their consumers. See 2003 CONG US S. 2560, introduced [ June 22, 2004] X. JARDIN Induce Act Draws
Support, Venom, WIRED NEWS [Aug.26,2004], http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,64723,00.html>
K . DEAN Copyright Proposal  Induces  Worry,   WIRED  NEWS [ Sept.11,2004] http://www.wired.com/
news/politics/0,1283,64870,00.html;  K.  DEAN, Big Anti-Induce  Campaig Planned, WIRED NEWS [Sept.
14, 2004]  at :  <http://www.wired.com/news/politics/  0,1283,64935,00.html> Eventually  the Induce  Act
was  shelved,  ostensibly  due  to  the  outcry among  technology companies. See K. DEAN, Senate Shelves
I n d u c e  R e v i e w, WIRED NEWS, [Oct. 7, 2004], at
<http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,65255,00.html>. Just a week later, however, former Attorney
General John Ashcroft vowed to “build the strongest, most aggressive legal assault against  intellectual
property crime in our nation’s history,” see Katie DEAN, Ashcroft Vows Piracy Assault, WIRED  NEWS, Oct.
14, 2004,  < http://www.wired.com/news/politics/ 0,1283,65331,00.html>.
30 See M. GOODMAN and S. BRENNER, The Emerging Consensus on Criminal Conduct in Cyberspace (UCLA
J. L. & T .), [2002], 3, 4-6.
31 See S. BRENNER, op. cit. p. 19.
32 See S. BRENNER, op. cit. p. 19.
8CHAWKI and ABDEL WAHAB, Lex Electronica, vol. 11 n°1 (Printemps / Spring 2006)
policies dealing such crimes. This b r ings  in to  ques t ion the  ef fec t iveness o f
te rr i to r ia l -based  s t ra teg ies and  po l ic ies  implemented  in a  rea l-wor ld
contex t .
Whilst efforts are underway to establish harmonized and consistent national strategies
and policies to combat cybercrime, global condemnation as well as adequate universal
policies may not be achieved in the near future at least until all states recognize the
importance of ICTs and the need for existence of an adequate regulatory framework.
2- IMPACT AND HARM GENERATED BY IDENTITY THEFT
According to the survey released by US Sentencing Commission on February
200533, 9.3 million Americans have been victims and suffered harm34 as a result by
the theft of their identity in the last twelve months.35 Moreover, in 2003, identity theft
losses to businesses and financial institutions totalled nearly $52, 6 billion and
consumer victims reported $5 billion in out-of- pocket expenses.36
Furthermore, the agency also released a commission report detailing its identity theft
program since its inception. The survey found that within a period of one year, 2.28
million consumers discovered that new accounts had been opened, and other
fraudulent activities such as renting an apartment or home, obtaining medical care or
employment, had been committed in their name.37
In those cases, the victims were categorized as follows: 2.28% Existing Credit Card
Account Fraud, 1.15% Existing non Credit Cards Accounts Fraud, and 0.83% New
Accounts and other Frauds, with a mean fraud loss of $ 5,803 per victim. Existing
Credit Card Accounts fraud is the least costly classification, while New Accounts and
other Frauds with a mean loss of $ 12,646 is the most serious category.38 Existing
non Credit Card Accounts fraud, which includes existing credit and saving accounts,
is the mid-range classification with a mean loss of $ 9.912.39
                                                 
33 See F.T.C. Survey 2004.
34 In penal theory, harm is the focal point between criminal conduct and the punitive sanction In relation to
criminal conduct, harm is essential as the relevant effect, the end sought. Without an effect or end, it is
impossible to have a cause or means, and everything in penal law associated with causation and   imputation
would be superfluous. [H]arm is equally necessary in the elucidation of punishment. Harm, in sum, is the
fulcrum between criminal conduct and the punitive sanction; and the elucidation of these interrelationships is a
principal task of penal theory. See also, e.g., Model Penal Code Articles 210-251(Official Draft and Revised
Commentary 1980); United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual 43-304 (Nov. 2003), at
<http://www.ussc.gov/2003guid/2003guid.pdf>. Oregon Criminal Justice Commission, Sentencing  Guidelines
Rules –  Crime Seriousness
Scale [2003], at <http://arcweb.sos.state.or.us/rules/OARS_200/OAR_213/213_017.html>.
35 The culpability calculus for these online crimes should be the same as for their real- world analogues. For
example, Id-theft, like real-world theft, requires that the offender have acted with the purpose of depriving
another of their property. This requirement is made for most other property crimes, such as online fraud, forgery,
extortion, etc. The culpability calculus should also remain the same for the “crimes against the person” that
migrate into cyberspace, as well as for crimes against the state and crimes against morality. Since human
behaviour is a constant in offline and online crime, and since our experience with human misbehaviour has
given us a good sense as to the appropriate levels of fault to assign to various misdeeds, we should not need to
alter culpability standards, except perhaps to accommodate new crime variations. See S. BRENNER, op. cit. p.
19.
36 An increase of 2, 3% with 2003.
37 See F.T.C. Survey 2004.
38 Id.
39 Id.
9CHAWKI and ABDEL WAHAB, Lex Electronica, vol. 11 n°1 (Printemps / Spring 2006)
According to the survey results, 5.2% of all identity theft victims discovered that they
were victims of identity theft by spyware.40 Another 2.51 percent reported that they
were victims through online transactions. 2.2 percent reported that they were victims
to online hackers and crooks. While most identity thieves use consumer personal
information to make purchases,41 1.7% of all victims reported that their personal
information was misused in non-financial ways, to obtain government documents, for
example, or on tax forms.42
The most common non-financial misuse took place when the thief used the victim’s
name and identifying information in the event of apprehension by law enforcement
authorities.
Family members and relatives along with friends and neighbours make up half of all
identity thieves.43 Identity theft committed by family members and relatives tend to
have greater financial and non-financial implications.
Although there has been recent public concern over electronic methods of obtaining
information, most thieves still obtain personal information through traditional rather
than electronic channels.44 In the cases where the methods were known, 68.2% of
information was obtained offline, versus only 11.6% obtained online by electronic
means.45
The length of time to detect is correlated with the amount of money embezzled, or in
other words, time is proportionate to money. Victims who take longer to detect fraud
are more likely to be victims of new accounts; the most costly type of fraud.
The slowest methods of discovering fraud are: (a) being contacted by creditors; or (b)
being turned down for low or bad credit record or history.
The report detailing the FTC’s identity theft program since its inception in 1998 states
that complaints to the agency about identity theft have nearly doubled each year
since then.46
                                                 
40 Identity theft, for example, can consist o f  either (i) the zero-sum phenomenon we know from the real-
world, in which the thief totally deprives an owner of the possession and use of her tangible or intangible
property; or (ii) of the non-zero-sum, online version in which the thief takes a copy of intangible property
and leaves the owner with the “original.” In both instances, the owner suffers a loss of property. However,
are the losses identical?  In a zero-sum theft, the owner is completely deprived of the   possession and use of
her property; in a non- zero-sum theft, she is deprived of a quantum of the possession and use of her property.
The harm associated with this less-than-zero-sum loss depends, at least in part, on the extent to which the
value of the property is a function of its exclusivity; in other words, the extent to which dominion and control
of the property is limited. See S. BRENNER, op. cit. p. 34.
41 See J. KANG:  Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1195-99 (1998)
(discussing how the private sector seeks to exploit data commercially for database marketing); Jonathan
Krim, Web Firms Choose Profit over Privacy; Policies Can Hide Sale of Customer Data, WASH.  POST,  [July
1, 2003],  at A1 (noting  that many Web sites promise  to protect consumer information from sale to a third
party, but instead often rent the information to others). For other studies on the surreptitious collection of
information in cyberspace, see generally R. Clarke, Information Technology and Dataveillance, available at
http://www.anu.edu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/DV/CACM88.html (1988)>; A. MICHAEL, The Death of
Privacy? 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461 [2000]; M. PAUL, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L.
REV. 1609
42 See F.T.C. Survey 2004.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Steven A. Hetcher, Commentaries on Eric Posner’s Law and Social Norms: Cyberian Signals, 36 U. RICH.
L. REV. 327, at 337-38 (2002), citing 15 U.S.C.  §§ 45(a)(1), 41-58 (observing that the Federal Trade
Commission has spearheaded a number of efforts to protect consumer privacy on the Web pursuant  to its
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3- FACTORS FACILITATING IDENTITY THEFT
Understanding the factors that contribute to the growth of the identity theft
problem certainly helps in devising adequate and effective measures of protection
and prevetion.
Generally, there are few scientific studies on identity theft victims, offenders, or
incidents, though there are some studies on aspects of identity theft-related
crimes such as check and credit card fraud.47
The most important findings with respect to victims of such crimes concern the
time taken to discover the crime:
• The longer it takes to discover the theft, the greater the victim’s loss
and suffering.48
• Low-income, less-educated victims take longer to discover or report
the crime, resulting in greater suffering, especially from harassment by
debt collectors, utility cut-offs, and banking problems49
With respect to victims’ characteristics, they are probably not directly related to
identity theft vulnerability.50 The average age of victims is the fourties. They most
often live in a large metropolitan area, and typically do not notice the crime for
over 14 months.51 On a different note, evidence suggests that seniors are less
victimized by identity theft than the rest of the population, though they can be
targeted in specific financial scams that may or may not involve identity theft.
From a racial perspective, African Americans may suffer more from non-credit
card identity theft, especially theft of telephone and other utility services and
check fraud.52
With respect to offenders or identity theft perpetrators, statistical data suggest that
the reasons underlying their criminal behaviour are two-fold:
First, it is easy to commit because of the ready availability of personal
information on the Internet, or contained in business files accessible to
dishonest employees or burglars. Many people are not vigilant in protecting their
personal information, and businesses are rarely held accountable for customer
information accessed by those unauthorized to do so.53 In toto, Opportunities
                                                                                                                                                         
authority  under the Federal  Trade Commission Act,  which mandates  that the  agency respond  to  “unfair”
and “deceptive” trade practices). For a discussion of the FTC’s role in protecting privacy, see Paul Schwartz,
Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV 1609(1999]; J. SOVERN, 69 FORDHAM L. REV.
1305 [2001].
47 Credit card fraud consists of the unauthorized use of a regularly issued or cloned credit card. See, e.g.,
Consumer Action, Preventing Credit Card Fraud, at <http://www.consumer-action.org/English/library/
credit_cards/2000_PreventingCreditFraud/index.php> (last accessed Sept.18, 2004); BBC News, Credit Card
Cloning (July 7, 2003), at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/insideout/east/series3/credit_card_cloning.shtml> (last
accessed Sept. 18, 2004). See G. NEWMAN, Identity theft (U.S. Department of Justice, COPS), [June 2004], p.
7.
48 Federal Trade Commission [2003a].
49 Id.
50 In fact, criminal harm differ in gravity, first, because of the differential external effect upon the victim and
the community, e.g. a battery is obviously less serious than a death; and secondly, by reference to the
degree of moral culpability of the offender,  e.g. a  death caused by a motorist’s reckless driving is a less serious
harm than a death caused by a deliberate murderer.
51 Federal Trade Commission [2003a].
52 Id.
53 Id.
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are legion. There are even websites that offer guides on how to create
alternative identities, to access other people’s personal identifying information,
and a step-by-step guidance on becoming a hacker.
Secondly, victims do not typically discover the crime until some time after it has
occurred, in some cases this could be years.54 If a retailer has lax security, and
an offender gets away with using a stolen credit card, the legitimate cardholder
may not realize it until receiving the next card statement.55
As previously mentioned, familiarity or close connection between the victim and
the offender provides opportunities for identity theft because of the availability of
personal information among relatives, co-workers, and others. According to the
1999-2001 FTC complaint files close to 11 percent of the complainants knew the
offender.56 Whilst, the FTC’s 2003 survey found that 86 percent of victims had no
relationship with the offender, other sources claim that up to 60 percent of
victims knew or had some information about the offender.57 Thus, statistical
information in this context have be approached with scepticism.
4- INFORMATION PRIVACY AND IDENTITY THEFT
Information in cyberspace is largely intangible. Thus, the architectural conditions that
support the nature of ownership in real-world and physical space and which vary
in their power and efficacy may not be entirely suitable for cyberspace.58
John Perry Barlow, a cyberspace futurologist, stated,
“legal concepts of property, expression, identity, movement and context do
not apply to us. They are based on matter. There is no matter here.”59
As Barlow suggests, the nature of both information and identity have been
transformed by their intangible and evanescent character in cyberspace.60
Nevertheless, such view has not prevented other scholars from treating cyberspace
like any other “place” and possibly applying some traditional conceptions thereto.61
Law confers property rights over profiles of consumer information to collectors,
rather than the individual subject, it creates substantial incentives for surreptitious
monitoring of consumer activity62. This, in turn, alters the fragile balance of privacy
and property by permitting accumulation of data that is often enabled by careless
consumers who unwittingly consent to such collections,63 but who continue to
                                                 
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Verton [2001].
57 Id.
58 See S. KAKYTL, Privacy vs. Privacy, Yale Journal of Law and Technology, [Winter 2004], p. 19.
59 See J. PARLOW, A Declaration of Independence of Cyberspace in Ibid.
60 See S. KAKYTL, op. cit.
61 See D. HUNTER, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anti Commons (Cal. Cal. L. Rev.), 439,
453-54 [2003], 91.
62 See D. HUNTER, op. cit.
63 For example, the Supreme Court has developed  a limited, “penumbral” conception of this right flowing
from a variety of constitutional sources—the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments,
and a host of later decisions that outline (and often complicate) the borders of this right.  U.S. CONST.
amend.I,III,IV,V,IX, XIV. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Cruzan v. Director, Miss.
Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S.
589 (1977); Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt
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retain expectations of informational privacy.64 This transition towards third-party
possession or ownership, in turn, has radically altered the pre-existing balance
between privacy and property contemplated in real space by subordinating the
protection of informational privacy to the accumulation of database property.65 Some
of these changes are attributable to an innate transformation in the value of
information itself. Although information has  always served  as  a  resource,  it  was
always “relegated  to the position of  supporting  other   resources.”
Today, however, since the advent of digital technology, information has become a
valuable commodity in and of itself, leading to a shift towards its
commercialization.66 Thus, the economic base of society has shifted from industry
to information, marking a transition into the third millennium of information economy
and digital revolution.
Vast amounts of personal information are now primed for harvest, distribution, and
disclosure to third parties on the Internet, often without the individual’s knowledge.67
In cyberspace, identity thieves are looking for sensitive personal information, and
there are many pieces of information that could be utilized.  Some of the most
common are68:
• Social Security Numbers (SSN) — These number was created to keep
an accurate record of earnings and pay retirement benefits on those
earnings.
• Date of Birth (DOB) — Date of birth, in conjunction with other pieces of
information, can be used in many ways to compromise a person’s identity.
• Current and Previous Addresses and Phone Numbers — Both can be
used in cybercrime and identity theft to enable an offender to assume the
identity of the victim or to obtain more information thereabout..
• Current and Previous Employment Information — Such information
can be used to jeopardize the victim’s identity.
• Financial Account Information — This includes checking and saving
accounts, credit cards, debit cards, and financial planning information.
Such information is a rich source for an identity thief to commit financial
cybercrimes.
• Mother’s Maiden Name — In many instances, the maiden name of the
victim’s mother may be used as the password for financial accounts and is
easily available through public record information.
• Other Personal Information — This includes passwords, passcodes,
email addresses as well as photos. Such information could be utilized to
                                                                                                                                                         
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Stanley v.  Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Loving v. Virginia; 388 U.S. 1
(1967); Griswold v.Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In addition, numerous federal and  state  enactments
affect  the  enforcement  of  privacy  rights  in  various ways. See  5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 630 (Deering 2003); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.  214,§ 1B (Law. Co-op 2002); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS
LAW § 50 (McKinney 2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-281   (2002); WIS. STAT§ 895.5 (2002).
64 See D. HUNTER, op. cit.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
68 See J. PETRO, op. cit.
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obtain access to other sensitive information or to facilitate total or partial
identity theft.
5- INFORMATION ACCESSIBILITY AND MECHANISMS OF
CYBERSPACE IDENTITY THEFT
Cyberspace69 makes it possible for anyone to gather personal information about
others.70 Much of this information is available for a price on the Internet.71
In a recent case, a Californian women downloaded credit reports from the same
websites used by landlords to conduct background checks on prospective tenants.72
Some sites sent her the credit reports, after nothing more than a mouse click
accompanied by a promise to use the information legally. At the time of her arrest,
the women had financial data on more than three hundred people.73
Similarly, a curious news correspondent recently decided to explore how easy it is to
get supposedly confidential financial records from such credit-checking sites. It took
him only two minutes and $ 14.95 to access his spouse’s credit report.74
On such account, it could be said that ICTs and cyberspace had facilitated the
following:75 (a) First, making public records quickly accessible to anyone who wants
them, even though most of this information has always been a matter of public
record, how to access it has not been common knowledge. Now anyone with a
computer and Internet access can do it.76
(b) Secondly, allowing identity thieves to work anonymously or after assuming the
identity of an innocent victim, and access information anywhere in the world.
A smart crook working on the Internet may turn a tax-free gain of as much as $
50.000 per week. There are many ways in which information could be obtained
online amongst which are: cyber-trespass, phony or sham websites and phishing and
pharming, spoofing, spyware, electronic bulletin boards, information brokers, internet
public records, and malicious applications such as trojan horses.
In the following pages we shall provide a brief overview of each of the above-
mentioned techniques.
                                                 
69 In fact, the term cyberspace literally means ‘navigable space’ and is derived from the Greek word kyber (to
navigate). In William Gibson’s 1984 novel, the original source of the term, cyberspace refers to, a navigable,
digital space of networked computers accessible from computer consoles, a visual, colourful, electronic,
Cartesian datascape known as ‘The Matrix’ where companies and individuals interact with, and trade in,
information. Since the publication of this novel, the term cyberspace has been re-appropriated, adapted and used
in a variety of ways, by many different constituencies, all of which refer in some way to emerging computer-
mediated communication and virtual reality technologies. Here, we refocus the definition back to the envisaged
by Gibson, so that cyberspace refers to the conceptual space within ICTs, rather than the technology itself. See
W. GIBSON, Neuromancer (New York, Grafton), [1984]; M. DODGE, Mapping Cyberspace (N.Y, Routeldge),
[2001] p. 1.
70 See ex., R. GELMAN, Protecting Yourself Online, The Definitive Resource on Safety, Freedom and Privacy in
Cyberspace ( Harpcollins Publishers), [ 1998].
71 See ex., M. BARKARDJIEVA, Internet Society: The Internet in Everyday Life (Sage Publishers), [2005].
72 See J. MAY, op. cit.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id.
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5-1 Cyber-Trespass or Hacking:77
Cyber-Trespass is becoming more common to commit identity theft. It can include
many different ways of using a computer and network to steal information, money, or
other valuables. Cyber-trespass offences include: embezzlement,78 unlawful
appropriation,79 corporate / espionage,80 plagiarism,81 and DNS cache poisoning.82
In April 2005, the DSW shoe chain revealed that hackers had stolen data from 1.4
million credit and debit card transaction at 108 stores in the U.S.83 The breach also
included account numbers from 96,000 check transactions. Moreover, some hackers
bypass and breach electronic security,84 and password barriers85 to gain access to a
                                                 
77 To some extent, the definition of cyber-trespass/hacking may vary depending on the context. Generally
speaking, a ‘hack’ used to be a clever solution to a restriction. A hack was an ingenious, but temporary, fix or
‘make-do’ rather than an attack on a computer system. However, in 1960s malicious hacking started with
compromising telephone systems and stealing telephone services or eavesdropping. It soon spread to computers
and networks. When we extend this term to the individuals who practice the art of hacking, however, the
definitions become murkier. The Oxford English Dictionary (1998) defines hacker as “a person who or thing that
hacks or cuts roughly” or “a person whose uses computers for a hobby, esp. to gain unauthorized access to data”.
In his book The Hacker Crackdown Brice STERLING takes a rather positive view of the activity, explaining that
the term hack ‘can signify the free-wheeling intellectual exploration of the highest and deepest potential of
computer systems. ‘Hacking can involve the heartfelt conviction that beauty be found in computers, that the fine
aesthetic in a perfect program can liberate the mind and spirit’. This is hacking as it was defined in Steven
LEVY’s much praised history of the pioneer computer milieu, Hackers published in 1994. Hacking or gaining
unauthorized access to computer system, programs, or data, open a broad playing filed for inflicting damage.
The New Hackers Dictionary offers six definitions for hacking and hacker: (a) A person who enjoys exploring
the details of programmable systems and how to stretch their capabilities, as opposed to many users, who prefer
to learn only the minimum necessary; (b) A person who enjoys the intellectual challenge of overcoming or
circumventing limitations; (c) A person good at programming quickly; (d) An expert in a particular language; (e)
A person who programs enthusiastically; (f) A malicious meddler who tries to discover sensitive information by
poking around. On such a base hacking can manifest itself in many ugly forms including “cyber murders”. A
British hacker hacked into a Liverpool hospital in 1994 and changed the medical prescriptions for the patients. A
nine-year-old patient who was ‘prescribed’ a highly toxic mixture survived only because a nurse decided to re-
check his prescription. The hacker’s motive - he wanted to know ‘what kind of chaos could be caused by
penetrating the hospital computer’! Others have not been so lucky. An underworld don who was only injured in
a shoot out was killed by an overdose of penicillin after a hacker broke into the hospital computers and altered
his prescription.
78 This involves misappropriating money or property for the criminal’s own use that has been entrusted to him by
someone else.
79 This crime differs from embezzlement in that the criminal was never entrusted with the valuables but gains
access from outside the organization and transfers funds, modifies documents giving him title to property he
doesn’t own, or the like.
80 In which persons outside/inside the company use the network to steal trade secrets, financial data, confidential
data.. etc.
81 This is the theft of someone else’s intellectual work with the intent of passing it off as one’s own.
82 Is a form of unauthorized interception in which intruders manipulate the contents of a computer’s DNS cache
to redirect network transmissions to their won servers.
83 See S. LEVY, Grand Theft Identity (N.Y., Newsweek), [September 5, 2005), pp. 41.
84 The main goal of Internet security is to keep proprietary information confidential, to preserve its integrity, and
to maintain its availability for those authorized to view that information. When information is accessed and
examined by unauthorized individuals, it is no longer confidential. By connecting to the Internet organizations
have made their information assets far more vulnerable to unauthorized access and breaches of confidentiality. If
data are tampered with, modified, or corrupted by intruders there is a loss of information integrity. Some times
this can happen inadvertently, but most often it is the intentional act of a hacker or a disgruntled employee
seeking revenge. Finally, if information is deleted or becomes inaccessible to authorized users, there is a loss of
availability. See R. SPINELLO, Regulating Cyberspace: The Policies and Technologies of Control (U.S.A,
Spinello), [2002] p. 207.
85 A password is a type of secret authentication word or phrase used to gain access. Passwords have been used
since Roman times. Internal to the computer, passwords have to be checked constantly. So, all computers try to
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company’s computer server, or sometimes the server of an ISP.86 They then steal
names, addresses, credit card numbers, and other information.87
In one case, individuals hacked into an ISP computer server and stole the records of
10,000 customers. They then sent a message to the ISP offering to return the stolen
data for $30,000. In the end, the hackers were apprehended and charged extortion –
but only after considerable damage.88
5-2 Phoney or Sham Websites: Phishing and Pharming
Identity thieves can also set up and use sham or phoney websites to commit their
crimes.
Phishing is a clear variation and manifestation of phoney communications and
websites.89 It is the act of sending an e-mail to a user falsely claiming to be an
established legitimate enterprise in an attempt to scam the user into surrendering
private information that will be used for identity theft. The e-mail directs the user to
visit a Web site where they are asked to update personal information, such as
passwords and credit card, social security, and bank account numbers, that the
legitimate organization already has. The Web site, however, is bogus and set up only
to steal the user’s information.90 Thus, phishing is essentially a method of committing
credit card fraud, identity theft and/or generic theft.   Phishing attacks use ‘spoofed’
e-mails and fraudulent websites designed to fool  recipients  into divulging personal
financial data such as credit card numbers, account usernames and passwords,
social security numbers, etc. By hijacking the trusted brands of well-known banks,
online retailers and credit card companies, phishers are able to convince up to 5% of
recipients to respond to them.
In one case, a cyber-criminal decided to impersonate the FBI in order to obtain Social
Security numbers and other personal information.91 He set up a complete fake
website with the FBI logo. As many citizens like to request information from the
government, the presence of such a request form on the website contributed to the
perception of its authenticity.92 Visitors to the web site furnished the information
                                                                                                                                                         
“cache” passwords in memory so that each time a password is needed the user does not need to be asked. If
someone hacks into the memory of a computer, he can sift the memory or page files for passwords. Password
crackers are utilities that try to ‘guess’ passwords. One way, the dictionary attack, involves trying out all the
words contained in a predefined dictionary of words. Ready-made dictionaries of millions of commonly used
passwords can be freely downloaded from the Internet. Another form of password cracking attack is ‘brute force’
attack. In this attack, all possible combinations of letters, numbers and symbols are tried out one by one till the
password is found out. See B. STERLING, The Hacker Crackdown (Batman Books) pp. 50 -51.
86 ISPs can  further  be broken  down  into two separate  groups: Online Service Providers—such as America
Online, Prodigy and Compuserve, who provide both Internet access as well as a system for posting and
exchanging content—and Internet Access Providers, who simply provide direct access to the Internet.
87 See J. MAY, op. cit.
88 Id.
89 The word phishing comes from the analogy that Internet scammers are using e-mail lures to fish for passwords
and financial data from the sea of Internet users. The term was coined in 1996 by hackers who were stealing
AOL Internet accounts by scamming passwords from unsuspecting AOL users. Since hackers have a tendency to
replacing “f” with “ph” the term phishing was derived. Available at
 <http://www.webopedia.com/DidYouKnow/Internet/2005/phishing.asp>
90 See Anti-Phishing Working Group, What Is Phishing? at <http://www.antiphishing.org/> (last accessed Sept.
18, 2004).
91 See J. MAY, op. cit.
92 Id.
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requested, including their credit card numbers to pay the ten dollar application fee.93
Surprisingly, not only such victims did not get a penny of what they paid but also
expended much time and effort fixing damaged credit histories.
In another recent case, a phisher e-mail claiming to be from MSN was sent to
computer users. It said: “we regret to inform you that technical difficulties arose with
our recent update. Unfortunately part of our customer data base and back up system
became inactive”.94 This authentic-looking message offered a toll free telephone
number in addition to a web link and urged individuals to click on the link to the phony
web site. The message then informed individuals that they needed to enter their
personal information. Later on, they realized that they were victims to this phishing
attack.
Similar in nature to phishing, pharming seeks to obtain personal or private (usually
financial related) information through domain spoofing. Rather than being spammed
with malicious and mischievous e-mail requests for you to visit spoof Web sites which
appear legitimate, pharming  ‘poisons’ a DNS server by infusing false information into
the DNS server, resulting in a user’s request being redirected elsewhere. The victim’s
browser, however will show you are at the correct website, which makes pharming
more serious and more difficult to detect. Whilst phishing attempts to scam people
one at a time, pharming allows the scammers to target large groups of people at one
time through domain spoofing.95
5-3 Spoofing
A closely interconnected and often confused term with phishing and pharming is
spoofing. A “spoofer”, in Internet terms, is defined generally as the “cracker” who
alters, or “forges,” an e-mail address, pretending to originate a message from a
different source address than that which he or she truly has.96 There are many ways
an attacker may do this, and there are many types of attacks. The attacker may do
this to gain access to a secured site that would accept the “hijacked” address as
one of few permissible addresses, or more maliciously, the reason may be to hide
the source of any type of attack.97 “Email spoofing is often an attempt to trick the
user into making a damaging statement or releasing sensitive information (such as
passwords).”98
                                                 
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 See <http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/p/pharming.html>
96 A “cracker” is someone whose interest includes unauthorized entry and modification of computer systems.
Although not the case, this term has become synonymous with the term “hacker,” who is someone intensely
interested in complex computer systems, but is often a systems operator or administrator who detects, repairs,
and prevents the break-in and damage done by “crackers.”
97 See R. FARROW, Source Address Spoofing: Forged Addressess aid Internet Attacks. Here’s What to do About
Them, N e t w o r k M a g a z i n e . c om,  [ M a y  1 ,  2 0 0 0 ] ,  at
<http://www.networkmagazine.com/shared/article/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=8702815>. (visited, 12/08/2005).
98 In fact, spoof attacks occur at the Protocol layer level. When the spoofer’s goal is to either gain access to a
secured site or to mask his or her true identity, he or she may hijack an unsuspecting victim’s address by
falsifying the message’s routing information so that it appears to have come from the victim’s account instead of
his or her own. He or she may do so through the use of “sniffers.” Since information intended for a specific
computer must pass through any number of other computers while in transit, the data essentially becomes fair
game, and sniffers may be used to essentially capture the information en route to its destination. Sniffer software
can be programmed to select data intended for any or every computer. Thus, the spoofer can use the recipient’s
address, which is found in the header, and configure his or her own machine to emulate the recipient’s machine.
When information comes along the network that is intended for the true recipient, the spoofer can receive it
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Furthermore, the spoofer may send an e-mail to the victims’ accounts claiming to be
from a system administrator, and request users to change their passwords to a
specified string, threatening to suspend their account if they do not comply.99
Similarly, they might send an e-mail claiming to be from a person in authority, and
request users to send them a copy of a password file or other sensitive information.
5-4 Spyware
Spyware is computer software that can be used to gather and remove confidential
information from any computer without the knowledge of the owner.100 Everything the
surfer does online, including his passwords, may be vulnerable to spyware.101
Spyware can put anyone in great danger of becoming a victim of identity theft.
Moreover, some forms of spyware can be installed on the computer from a remote
location without the identity thief ever having physical access to the victim’s
computer.102 We would think that it would be difficult for the average person to find
spyware, but it is not. Typically it is used by employers monitoring employees’
computer use and parents who monitor their children’s computer use. Spyware could
also be used by a not-too-trusting spouse who wants to know what his or her spouse
is doing online. Additionally, some file sharing programs also contain spyware.
Sometimes this information is used merely to send advertisements for products and
services that may interest the surfer.103
5-5 Electronic Bulletin Boards
Chat rooms and electronic bulletin boards have become breeding grounds for identity
theft.104 When criminals have obtained personal identifying information such as credit
card numbers or social security numbers, they visit hacker chat rooms and post
messages that they have personal information for sale.105
In one case, a former employee of an insurance company stole a database
containing sixty thousand personnel records and sold some of the private information
over the Internet.106 He posted a message on an electronic bulletin board announcing
that he had thousands of names and social security numbers for sale.107 Further
                                                                                                                                                         
instead. In this way, the spoofer is able to gain entry into those sites to which the recipient had access, and thus
has the ability to now steal passwords, credit card information, and other personal information, and use that
information for any number of illegitimate purposes. Additionally, the spoofer can also automatically send a
packet back to the sender, which makes the sender believe that its message was properly received. The spoofer
may also alter the original e-mail and then relay it on to the intended recipient, or he or she can change the
message in its entirety, and send it to a different recipient or recipients altogether. If and when the recipient
responds, that message will be routed back to the original sender, not to the spoofer. The spoofer, however, will
need to sniff the response off the network for the attack to go unnoticed. Conversely, when the spoofing involves
unsolicited bulk e-mail, the attacker will choose not to sniff the responses off the network, thereby remaining
unacquainted with the effects of his or her attacks. These hostile reactions have been the cause for spammers to
mask their identities initially. See Id.
99 Id.
100 See, on spywares PC Magazine (N.Y., Wiley), [2005], p. 8.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 See J. McNamara, Secrets of Computer Espionage: Tactics and Countermeasures (London, Wiley Publishing,
Inc.), [1998].
104 See J. MAY, op. cit. p. 17.
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investigation revealed that he had also posted the credit card number of a former
supervisor.
Surprisingly, some offenders are sufficiently brazen to post their offerings on
websites that are sort of fraudster eBay. At one site, it was posted by a member of
the Shadow crew organisation that for $200 a person can get 300 credit cards
without the security codes printed on the back of the card. If card numbers with the
code are required, the cost will be 200$ for 50 cards.108
In April 16, 2004, a Manchester, New Hampshire man was sentenced on eight felony
counts related to a website and electronic bulletin boards where he posted for sale
thousands of Social Security Numbers and other personal information belonging to
employees of Global Crossing, as well as threats to injure or kill.109
5-6 Information Brokers
Information brokers have been around for decades, however, a new breed of
information broker has emerged in recent years; the kind that sells personal
information to anyone requesting it electronically via the Internet.110 Driven by greed,
some information brokers are careless when they receive an order. They fail to verify
the identity of the requesting party and do little, if any, probing into the intended use
of the information.
In one case, an online information broker was sued by the parents of a young woman
slain by an Internet stalker.111 it was alleged that for a nominal fee the broker sold
personal information that led the killer to the victim’s place of employment. He then
ambushed her as she got into her car after leaving work.112
In another very recent 2005 case, a Chicago based engineer, aged 42, was paying
$40 a year to have the Trans Union credit agency monitor his credit report.113
Unfortunately, when an identity thief somehow got the victim’s information and used it
to open new credit lines in stores, the stores authorized his credit with one of
TransUnion’s rivals, Equifax. Over a period of eight weeks, the offender charged
$3,000 on credit cards and spends an additional $1,000 on telephone calls.114 The
victim, driven by the will to clear his name and records, spent hundred of dollars
sending out certified letters to close accounts and, haunted by visions of overseas
hucksters, even called the State Department.115
In another case, a 24-year old Indian man who at the time (March 2005) worked for
Gurgaon-based online marketing firm named Infinity eSearch, allegedly sold
information on 1,000 bank accounts to an undercover journalist working for The Sun
for £ 2,750. The victim has since claimed that he was only a middleman and that he
did not sell data collected by his employer.116 Infinity eSearch has said the company
does not handle any data for the banks named in the Sun report, and that the victim
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did not have access to confidential data of any kind through his employment with the
company, according to press reports. But the case has raised fears of an anti-
outsourcing blacklash if Indian firms are seen to be careless with the data they
handle.117
In the case of R v Thompson,118 Thompson, a computer programmer, was employed
by a bank in Kuwait. Whilst so employed, he devised a plan to defraud the bank.
Details of customer’s accounts were maintained on computer. A number of these
accounts were dormant, i.e, no transactions had taken place over a significant period
of time. Thompson devised a program which instructed the computer to transfer
sums from these accounts to accounts which he had opened with bank. In an effort
to minimise the risks of detection, the transfers were not to be made until Thompson
had left the bank and was on a plane returning to England. On his return, Thompson
opened a number of accounts with English banks and wrote to the manager of the
Kuwaiti bank instructing him to arrange for the transfer of the balances from his
Kuwaiti accounts.119 This was done but subsequently his conduct was discovered
and Thompson was detained by the police. Charges of obtaining property by
deception were brought against him and a conviction was secured. An appeal was
lodged on the question of jurisdiction. Whilst not denying any of the facts received
above, Thompson argued that any offence had been committed in Kuwait and,
therefore, that the English courts had no jurisdiction in the matter. This plea did not
commend itself to the Court of Appeal which held that the offence was committed at
the moment when the Kuwaiti manager read and acted upon Thompson’s letter. At
this stage, Thompson was subject to the jurisdiction of the English courts.120
5-7 Internet Public Records
People search and genealogy websites have come under fire and some consumers
are concerned that personal information online can be used to commit identity theft.
Privacy advocates have become extremely concerned about the ease with which
people can obtain personal information online.
Local State and Federal governments have begun to make public records of all
kinds available online. For example, birth and death records have long been
available to the public through state offices, but people had to physically visit the
court house. Now it can be accessed by computer.
In one recent case, Judy McDonough, a 56-year-old occupational psychologist from
Shaw, England, suffered a disturbing blow: she realized someone had stolen her
identity from Internet.121 But by that time, the thief had already opened two credit
cards in her name, taken out three bank loans and ordered £ 2, 3000 in debt in three
years.122 McDonough tried six times to report the crime to the local authorities, and
bank officers made lacklustre efforts to help. Finally, McDonough turned to her
Member of Parliament for assistance. Hitherto the thief – who McDonough suspects
is a relative- has not been caught.123
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In another very recent case,124 an American citizen tried to sell his house in
California. He contacted several real estate agents to discuss with them a listing for
the house. He was then informed by these agents that his house has been rented to
individuals that he was not aware of or have even agreed to rent his house to.
Someone was collecting the rent on his house, and upon checking with the USA
county records he found out that someone has used his name and arranged to fake
his signature, made a power of attorney in his name and received loans on his
property, bought a business in his name and has accumulated a huge amount of
financial burden in his name as well. The personal information of this victim was
found and downloaded from Internet.
5-8 Malicious Applications: Trojan Horses
In this context, a Trojan horse could be defined as an application that appears to be
benign, but instead performs some type of malicious activity.125 A Trojan can be
disguised as a game, an e-mail attachment, or even a Web page.126 As soon as the
victim runs or opens the camouflaged application, the Trojan installs itself on the hard
drive and then runs each time Windows is started.127
Successful Trojan attacks are based on exploiting both human and computer security
weaknesses. First and foremost, to get a Trojan onto a computer the attacker has to
do some social engineering to convince the target to do something that installs and
runs the Trojan.128 He will also need to deal with any electronic defenses that are in
place, such as firewall, antivirus, or anti-Trojan software.129
Once installed, the Trojan will carry out whatever evil deeds that its creator designed
it for. This may include: uploading files; viewing the desktop in real time; retrieving
cached passwords; logging keystrokes; editing the registry…etc.130
It is worthnoting that unlike worms, Trojans do not self-replicate. After the rouge
application is installed on a system, it does not try to spread itself to other computers.
If it does, then it is considered to be a virus or a worm.
6- USING STOLEN IDENTITES
Offenders use victim’s personal information in diverse and numerous ways, amongst
the most common examples of usage are:131
• They may call the credit card issuer to change the billing address on the
victim’s credit card account. The imposter then runs up charges on the
victim’s account. Because his bills are being sent to a different address, it may
be some time before the victim realizes that there is a problem. In the District
of Delaware, one defendant was sentenced to a thirty-three months
imprisonment and $160,910.87 in restitution, and another defendant to a forty-
one months imprisonment and $126,298.79 in restitution for obtaining names
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and Social Security Numbers of high-ranking military officers from an Internet
website and using them to apply on-line for credit cards and bank and
corporate credit in the officers’ names.132
• They may open new credit card accounts in the victim’s name. When they
use the credit cards and do not pay the bills, the delinquent accounts are
reported on the victim’s credit report.
• They may use it in illegal drug or human trafficking. In the District of Oregon,
seven defendants have been sentenced to imprisonment for their roles in a
heroin/methamphetamine trafficking organization, which included entering the
United States illegally from Mexico and obtaining SSNs of other persons.133
The SSNs were then used to obtain temporary employment and identification
documents in order to facilitate the distribution of heroin and
methamphetamine. In obtaining employment, the defendants used false alien
registration receipt cards, in addition to the fraudulently obtained SSNs, which
provided employers enough documentation to complete employment
verification forms. Some of the defendants also used the fraudulently obtained
SSNs to obtain earned income credits on tax returns fraudulently filed with the
Internal Revenue Service.134 Some relatives of narcotics traffickers were
arrested in possession of false documents and were charged with possessing
false alien registration receipt cards and with using the fraudulently obtained
SSNs to obtain employment. A total of twenty-seven defendants have been
convicted in the case, fifteen federally and twelve at the state level.135
• They may use the information to make telephone calls. In United States v.
Bosanac, no. 99CR3387IEG the defendant was involved in a computer
hacking scheme that used home computers for electronic access to several of
the largest United States telephone systems and for downloading thousands
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of calling card numbers (access codes).136 The defendant, who pleaded guilty
to possession of unauthorized access devices and computer fraud, used his
personal computer to access a telephone system computer and to download
and transfer thousands of access codes relating to company calling card
numbers. In taking these codes, the defendant used a computer program he
had created to automate the downloading, and instructed his co-conspirators
on how to use the program. The defendant admitted that the loss suffered by
the company as a result of his criminal conduct was $955,965. He was
sentenced to eighteen months’ imprisonment and $10,000 in restitution.
• They may counterfeit checks or credit or debit cards, or authorize electronic
transfers in another name, and drain the bank account.137 In a recent case, a
women got back from her vacation in Las Vegas to find out that her sister has
been using her credit card ($584) and has committed fraudulent activities in
her name. The victim did not order or receive any of the items that were
charged. Moreover, when she got home, she opened all her mail and
discovered that she has been denied housing because her sister had stolen
her identity.
• They may file for bankruptcy under another name to avoid paying debts they
have incurred or to avoid eviction.
• They may buy a car by taking out a loan in another name. In United States v.
Wahl, No. CR00-285P 138 (W.D. Wash. sentenced Oct. 16, 2000), the
defendant obtained the date of birth and Social Security number of the victim
(who shared the defendant’s first, last name and middle initial). He then used
the victim’s identifying information to apply online for credit cards with three
companies and to apply online for a $15,000 automobile loan. He actually
used the proceeds of the automobile loan to invest in his own business. (The
defendant, after pleading guilty to identity theft, was sentenced to seven
months imprisonment and nearly $27,000 in restitution).139
• They may get identification such as a driver’s license issued with their
picture, in the victim’s name.
• They may give the victim’s name to the police during an arrest. In such case
if they do not show up at court on the hearing date, a warrant for arrest will be
issued in the victim’s name.
By and large, the first part or section of this research focused on the concept of
Identity theft, its different forms, interests at stake, and provided an overview of the
diverse mechanisms for committing identity theft.
In the following part or section, we shall focus on potential solutions to combat and
prevent identity theft as well as addressing the need for establishing an effective
regulatory and legislative framework to deter offenders. Furthermore, an overview of
possible ICT applications that could be used to prevent or, at the least, mitigate the
occurrence and impact of identity theft will be provided.
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PART II: CYBERSPACE IDENTITY THEFT PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
From logical, theoretical, and pragmatic perspectives, knowing the problem, risks
associated therewith, and the ills resulting therefrom is an indispensable step
towards a possible solution. Furthermore, such determination constitutes an integral
part of devising effective vaccines and serums to eradicate and prevent this evil.
Having discussed the diverse aspects of the vexing problem of identity theft, we shall
now address some of the potential solutions thereto. Thus, we shall first analyze and
ascertain the need for adequate regulatory and legislative approaches, and conclude
by exploring and scrutinizing a number of technical solutions or approaches that aim
to enhance privacy and provide a secure medium for data transfer in a manner that
protects the confidentiality and integrity of personal information, and hence reducing
identity theft in cyberspace.
1- REGULATORY STRATEGIES AND LEGISLATIVE
APPROACHES: A QUEST FOR GLOBAL HARMONIZATION
1.1. National and Regional Strategies: The European Approach
The adaptation of established legal norms and standards to new forms of identity
theft in Europe resulted in a multitude of novel and complex legal questions.
Under this sub-section, we shall focus on two forms of anti-identity theft legislation: (i)
the protection of privacy; and (ii) the protection against economic and financial crime.
1.1.1. The Protection of Privacy:
Legislative framework against infringement of privacy rights is existent in most
European countries both on national and regional levels. Despite the ongoing efforts
for harmonization and unification of data protection and privacy standards spurred by
a number of supra-national European instruments in this context such as the 2002
EU Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications, a pragmatic analysis of
such efforts reveal that some differences are still persistent, especially regarding the
procedural and institutional framework, which merit further consideration.
On such a basis, a comparative analysis of the protection of privacy results in
distinguishing four main categories of privacy infringements pertinent to EU privacy
legislation: (a) violation of substantive privacy rights; (b) violation of formal legal
requirements; (c) violation of access rights; and (d), negligence in security measures.
Infringements of substantive privacy rights includes the following offences:
• The illegal entering, modification, and/or falsification of data with the
intent to inflict harm or damage.
• The storage of incorrect data. This act in most countries is covered by
the general offences of information and in some countries by additional
statutes within the privacy laws.
• The illegal disclosure, dissemination, obtaining of and/or access to
data, acts which are covered in most laws, however, to different
degrees.
• The unlawful use of data.
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However, due to the uncertainties in implementing substantive provisions, many legal
systems rely to a great extent on an additional group of offences against formal legal
requirements or orders of supervisory agencies. These formal provisions also vary
considerably within the national legislation.
Formal offences which can be found in many European privacy legislations are: the
infringement of some regulations, prohibitions, or decisions of the surveillance
authorities; the refusal to give information or the release of false information to the
surveillance authorities; obstructing the work of surveillance authorities; the refusal to
grant access to property and the refusal to permit inspections by surveillance
authorities; the obstruction of the execution of a warrant; the failure to appoint a
controller of data protection in the company, as well as neglecting to record the
grounds or means for the dissemination of personal data.
The third category of privacy infringement is the individual’s rights of information or
freedom of information. With regard to a party’s right of access, in many countries
such as in Luxembourg and Sweden – it is an offence to give false information, not to
inform the registered party or not to reply to a request.
With respect to the fourth category, some legislators penalize for negligence of
security measures by an administrative fine or a penal sanction.140
1.1.2. Computer Related Economic Crimes141
As a reaction to the acceleration and increase in computer-related economic
crimes,142a reform for combating and preventing computer-related economic crimes
has been underway since the 1980s. Due to the accelerated pace of advancement in
ICTs and the emergence of new forms of computer-related financial crimes, which
posed a serious threat to the development of e-commerce and progression of the
global information economy, many states within the EU and all around the globe
have enacted new legislations or amended existing laws to penalize and prevent
illegal access to computer systems as well as computer-related crimes that
undermine the stable infrastructure of cyberspace.
In this context, it is worth noting that the Council of Europe Budapest Convention on
Cybercrime marks a new era of international cooperation in penal and criminal
matters. Mindful of the necessity to deter actions directed against the confidentiality,
integrity and availability of computer systems, networks and computer data, as well
as the misuse of such systems, networks and data, by providing for the
criminalisation of such conduct, as described in the Convention, Member States of
the EU as well as other signatories have sought to provide a supranational regulatory
framework in order to effectively combate computer-related offences, by facilitating
the detection, investigation and prosecution of such criminal offences at both the
domestic and international level, and by providing arrangements for fast and reliable
international co-operation.143
                                                 
140 See Denmark, section 27(1) no. 2 Private Registers Act. Luxembourg, section 36 of the Act Regulating the
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By and large, in order to combat identity theft and ensure the protection of privacy
and personal data in cyberspace, effective legislative framework for combating
cybercrime is an absolute necessity to dispense with new forms of financial and
computer-related crimes such as hacking (cyber-trespass) and computer espionage.
1.1.1. Cyber-Trespass
Cyber-trespass has been previously addressed whilst analyzing the diverse
mechanisms for identity theft in cyberspace. However, in this context our focus shall
be on the necessity for devising adequate and efficient legislative policies that target
cyber-trespass and consider hacking a serious criminal offence.
In those jurisdictions with developed criminal norms that target computer misuse,
such as the United States, the policy has been to penalize the initial unauthorized
access of a computer system.
Similarly, in some jurisdictions, penalizing computer trespass is absolute regardless
of the motivation or reason for the intrusion.144 Thus, the act of unauthorized access
in itself constitutes a criminal offence regardless of the underlying reasons and even
if they were legitimate or even if no harm was intended.
In response to the new cases of “hacking”, many countries developed new statutes
protecting a “formal sphere of secrecy” for computer data by criminalising the illegal
access to or use of a third person’s computer or computer data.
On such a basis, legislation covering wiretapping and unauthorised access to data
processing and communication systems have therefore, been enacted in Canada,
Denmark, Germany, Finland, France, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom,145 and the United States.146
Moreover, some of the new laws which have been proposed demonstrate various
approaches, which range from provisions penalizing “mere” access to
DP-systems,147 to those punishing access only in cases where the accessed data are
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protected by security measures,148 where the perpetrator has harmful intentions,149
where information is obtained, modified or damaged,150 or where a minimum damage
is caused.151 Other countries, 152 combine one or more of these approaches with a
“basic” hacking offence and the creation of qualified forms of access (in a more
serious “ulterior” offence) carrying more severe sanctions.
1.1.2. Computer Espionage
Ranking amongst the most serious forms of cybercrime that pertain to national
security, the act of computer espionage raises the following question: to what extent
pure acquisition of incorporeal information can or should be covered national
legislations?
Many European countries, such as Belgium, Italy, are reluctant to apply the
traditional provisions on theft and embezzlement to the unauthorised “appropriation”
of secret information, because these legislations generally require that corporeal
property is taken away with the intention of permanently depriving the victim of it.153
In Japan, according to Articles 235, 252 and 253 of the Penal Code, the definition
of the intention of unlawful appropriation has been broadened to include the intent to
use property only temporarily. Nevertheless, Japanese law still requires the taking of
tangible property and cannot be applied if data are accessed via telecommunication
facilities. Whatever might be the case, enacting national laws or amending existing
laws to efficiently deal with computer-related crimes such as hacking and espionage
is a fundamental prerequisite to securing the confidentiality and secrecy of electronic
data and personal information, and assists in the progressive development of
cyberspace as a secure medium for trading and communicating.
By and large, having addressed the European approach to providing a safe harbour
regulatory and legislative framework for combating identity theft and cybercrime, it is
necessary to shed some light on the American approach to such problems.
1.2. Prosecuting Identity Theft under Federal Criminal Laws: American
Approach
There are a number of federal laws applicable to identity theft, some of which may be
used for prosecution of identity theft offences, and some of which exist to assist
victims in repairing their credit history.
The primary identity theft statute is 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7) and was enacted on
October 30, 1998, as part of the Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act
(Identity Theft Act). The Identity Theft Act was needed because 18 U.S.C. § 1028
previously addressed only the fraudulent creation, use, or transfer of identification
documents, and not the theft or criminal use of the underlying personal information.
The Identity Theft Act added Section §1028(a)(7) which penalizes fraud in connection
with the unlawful theft and misuse of personal identifying information, regardless of
whether the information appears or is used in documents.
                                                 
148 See for example, Germany, the Netherlands, and Norway.
149 See for example, Canada, France, Israel, New Zealand, and Scotland.
150 Some states of the USA.
151 Spain.
152 See for example, Finland, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom.
153 See for example, the Penal Code of Belgium section 461, and the Italian Penal Code sections 624 and 646.
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Section 1028(a)(7) provides that it is unlawful for anyone who:
“Knowingly transfers or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of
another person with the intent to commit, or to aid or abet, any unlawful activity that
constitutes a violation of Federal law, or that constitutes a felony under any
applicable State or local law...”
The Identity Theft Act amended the penalty provisions of §1028(b) by extending its
coverage to offenses under the new §1028(a)(7) and applying more stringent
penalties for identity thefts involving property of value.
Section 1028(b)(1)(D) provides for a term of imprisonment of not more than fifteen
years when an individual commits an offence that involves the transfer or use of one
or more means of identification if, as a result of the offence, anything of value
aggregating $1,000 or more during any one year period is obtained. Otherwise,
§1028(b)(2)(B) provides for imprisonment of not more than three years.
Furthermore, the Identity Theft Act added §1028(f) which provides that attempts or
conspiracies to violate §1028 are subject to the same penalties as those prescribed
for substantive offences under §1028.
Moreover, the Identity Theft Act amended § 1028(b)(3) to provide that if the offence
is committed to facilitate a drug trafficking crime, or in connection with a crime of
violence, or is committed by a person previously convicted of identity theft, the
individual is subject to a term of imprisonment of not more than twenty years.
Additionally, the Identity Theft Act added § 1028(b)(5) which provides for the
forfeiture of any personal property used or intended to be used to commit the
offence.
Section §1028(d)(3) defines “means of identification”, as used in §1028(a)(7), to
include “any name or number that may be used, alone or in conjunction with any
other information, to identify a specific individual.” It covers several specific
examples, such as name, social security number, date of birth, government issued
driver’s license and other numbers; unique biometric data, such as fingerprints, voice
print, retina or iris image, or other physical representation; unique electronic
identification number; and telecommunication identifying information or access
device.
Section§1028(d)(1) modifies the definition of “document-making implement” to
include computers and software specifically configured or primarily used for making
identity documents.
The Identity Theft Act is intended to cover a variety of individual identification
information that may be developed in the future and utilized to commit identity theft
crimes. The Identity Theft Act also directed the United States Sentencing
Commission to review and amend the Sentencing Guidelines to provide appropriate
penalties for each offence under Section §1028.
The Sentencing Commission responded to this directive by adding U.S.S.G. §2F1.1
(b) (5) which provides the following: “(5) If the offense involved – (A) the possession
or use of any device-making equipment; (i) the unauthorized transfer or use of any
means of identification unlawfully to produce or obtain any other means of
identification; or (ii) the possession of [five] or more means of identification that
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unlawfully were produced from another means of identification or obtained by the use
of another means of identification, increase by 2 levels. If the resulting offense level
is less than level 12, increase to level 12”.
These new guidelines take into consideration the fact that identity theft is a serious
offence, whether or not certain monetary thresholds are met. For most fraud
offenses, the loss would have to be more than $70,000.00 for the resulting offence
level to be level 12.
In providing for a base offence level of 12 for identity theft, the Sentencing
Commission acknowledged that the economic harm from identity theft is difficult to
quantify, and that whatever the identifiable loss, offenders should be held
accountable.
Identity theft offences will usually merit a two-level increase because they often
involve more than minimal planning or a scheme to defraud more than one victim.
(U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(2)).
Identity theft offences may also provide for two to four-level upward organizational
role adjustments when multiple defendants are involved. (U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1)
As previously mentioned, identity theft is often committed to facilitate other crimes,
although it is frequently the primary goal of the offender. Schemes to commit identity
theft may involve a number of other statutes including identification fraud (18 U.S.C.
§1028(a)(1) - (6)), credit card fraud (18 U.S.C. §1029), computer fraud (18 U.S.C.§
1030), mail fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1341), wire fraud (18 U.S.C. §1343), financial
institution fraud (18 U.S.C. §1344), mail theft (18 U.S.C. § 1708), and immigration
document fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1546).
For example, computer fraud may be facilitated by the theft of identity information
when stolen identity is used to fraudulently obtain credit on the Internet. Computer
fraud may also be the primary vehicle to obtain identity information when the offender
obtains unauthorized access to another computer or web site to obtain such
information. These acts might result in the offender being charged with both identity
theft under 18 U.S.C. §1028(a)(7) and computer fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4).
Regarding computer fraud, it should be note that U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(c)(1) provides a
minimum guideline sentence, notwithstanding any other adjustment, of a six month
term of imprisonment if a defendant is convicted of computer fraud under 18 U.S.C. §
1030(a)(4).
It is worth noting in this context that identity theft schemes may involve other statutes.
For example, this includes the case of an offender who fraudulently obtains identity
information by posing as an employer in correspondence with a credit bureau. This
offender might appropriately be charged with both identity theft under 18 U.S.C.
§1028(a)(7) and mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. §1341.
Moreover, an offender who steals mail thereby obtaining identity information might
appropriately be charged with identity theft under 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7) and mail
theft under 18 U.S.C. §1708.
Furthermore, the offender who fraudulently poses as a telemarketer thereby
obtaining identity information might appropriately be charged with both identity theft
under 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7) and wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1343.
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1.3. International Strategies: The Council of Europe Convention on
Cybercrime
Cyberspace is a primarily a borderless society. Thus, there is a persisting need to
establish global norms and standards that govern conduct and behaviour in this
virtual world. On such account, national or regional policies, despite their necessity,
may not be the best option available. This calls for universal or global regulatory
framework that takes into account the inherent transnational and sweeping impact of
cybercrime in general and identity theft in particular.
Despite the intrinsic difficulty in harmonizing or unifying criminal and penal policies,
being a manifestation of sovereign power and authority, the stakes of cyberspace
have instigated states to tread upon this erratic and wobbly territory marking a new
epoch of cooperation in criminal and public law matters.
Incontrovertibly, the above-mentioned Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime
is a huge step towards realizing the long lost hope for cooperation in the field of
criminal law and cybercrime.154
The primary purpose of the Convention155 is to harmonize domestic substantive
criminal law   offences and investigation procedures.156
The Convention drafters’ principal concerns were two-fold:157 first, they wanted to
ensure that the definitions were flexible enough to adapt to new crimes and methods
of committing existing crimes as they evolve.158 Secondly, the drafters wanted the
Convention to remain sensitive to the legal regimes of nation-states.159
These concerns were especially challenging in the human rights area because states
have different moral and cultural values.160 For example, European nations have a
much higher degree of privacy protection than the United States.161 The United
States, on the other hand, has stronger speech protection than other states.162
                                                 
154 See Supra.
155 On November 23, 2001, in Budapest, Hungary, the United States and 29 other countries signed the Council of
Europe Cybercrime Convention, the first multilateral instrument drafted to address the problems posed by the
spread of criminal activity on computer networks. The Cybercrime Convention will require parties to establish
laws against cybercrime, to ensure that their law enforcement officials have the necessary procedural authorities
to investigate and prosecute cybercrime offenses effectively, and to provide international cooperation to other
parties in the fight against computer-related crime. See Council of   Europe, Convention on Cybercrime   (ETS
No.    185),
available at <http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/185.htm> (last  visited  Sept. 21, 2004).
156 See Preamble (recognizing the need to ensure a proper balance between human rights and law enforcements
needs); (articulating the need to balance human rights with individual privacy in defining crimes and
implementing  investigative procedures); U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Hearing on  Security Risks in
Electronic Commerce, in FDHC Political Transcripts (July 16, 2001) (statement  of U.S. Senator Ron Wyden
(D-OR) Chairman) (discussing the Convention and stating, “we’re trying to balance security versus liberty”).
Available at:
<http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/185.htm>.
157 See Explanatory Memorandum, available at <http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Reports/Html/185.htm>.
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161See S. HOPKINS, Cybercrime Convention: A Positive Beginning to a Long Road Ahead (Journal of High
Technology Law), [2004], p. 105.
162 S e e  Draft Hate Speech Protocol to the Convention [Sept. 5, 2002], available at:
<http://assembly.coe.int//Documents/WorkingDocs/doc02/EDOC9538.htm>.
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To further its purpose, the Convention also empowers parties to restrict or eliminate
criminalization of certain offences, and limit investigation procedures by reservation.
The Convention’s drafters have, thus, attempted to strike an equitable balance
between crime definitions, the investigation needs for law enforcement, and
individual rights.163
The Convention is broken up into four main segments, with each segment consisting
of several Articles.
The first segment or section outlines the substantive criminal law aspects which all
ratifying countries should implement to prevent the listed offences.164
The second section delineates the procedural and investigation requirements and
standards to which individual countries must adhere.
The third section sets out guidelines for international cooperation that most
commonly involve joint investigations of the criminal offences listed under section
one.165
Finally, the fourth section contains the provisions pertaining to the signing of the
Convention, territorial application of the Convention declarations, amendments,
withdrawals, and the ever-important, federalism clause.166
Amongst the most important crimes covered by the Convention, whose
criminalization exerts a profound impact on preventing and combating identity theft
are:
(a) “illegal access” or access to a computer system without right.167 “Access”
deals with entering into any part of the computer system, such as hardware
components and stored data but it “does not include” the mere sending of an e-
mail message to a file system. The corresponding US provision is found in the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 (“CFAA”) ;168
(b) “illegal interception” where Article (3) of the Convention criminalizes the
interception, without right, of non-public transmissions of computer data,
whether by telephone, fax, email, or file transfer.169 This provision is aimed at
protecting the right to privacy of data communications.170 One element of this
offence is that interception occurs through “technical means” which is the
surveillance of telecommunications through the use of electronic eavesdropping
or tapping devices.171 However, it should be noted that this provision does not
                                                 
163 Id.
164 Many of the crimes committed against individuals and businesses are legislated against in the European
Convention on Cybercrime, and include identity theft, child pornography, and fraud.
165 Convention, op. cit.
166 Id.
167 See Article 2 of the Convention. Examples of unauthorised intrusions are hacking, cracking, or computer
trespassing. Intrusions such as these allow identity thieves to gain access to confidential data, such as passwords
and social security numbers.
168 The act makes it unlawful to either knowingly access a computer without authorization or to exceed
authorization and obtain protected or restricted data.  (18 U.S.C § 30 (2000))
169 It should be noted in this context that the non-public nature relates only to the transmission and not the
transferred data transferred.
170 Explanatory Report, op. cit.
171 Id.
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exhaustively define what forms of interception are lawful and which are not,
leaving this a matter of national policy;
(c) “data and system interference”, where Articles (4) and (5) criminalize the
intentional damaging, deletion, deterioration, alteration, suppression of
computer data without right, or serious hindering without right of the functioning
of a computer system by inputting, transmitting, damaging, deleting,
deteriorating, altering or suppressing computer data; and
(d) “misuse of devices”, where Article (6) establishes, as separate and
independent offences, the intentional commission of illegal acts regarding
certain devices that are utilized for the commission of the listed offences under
the Convention.172 This Article not only covers tangible transfers but also the
creation or compilation of hyperlinks facilitating hacker access to these devices.
However, in this context, a vexing issue arises with respect to “dual-use devices” or
multi-purpose devices that could have more than one function. In such cases, the
drafters intended the latter Article to relate to devices that are objectively “designed,
or adapted, primarily for the purpose of committing an offence. Furthermore, this
provision requires both a general intent and a specific intent that the device is used
for the purpose of committing any of the offences listed under the Convention.    
Having addressed a number of regulatory and legislative policies and efforts needed
to combat cybercrime and identity theft, we shall move on to shed some light on a
number of technical precautions and techniques that would certainly minimize the
risk of identity theft, and act as preventive measures to cybercrime.
2- TECHNICAL APPROACHES
ICTs are a double-edged sword that, despite being used to commit online identity
theft, could act as risk minimizing or mitigating factors to enhance privacy and secure
the confidentiality and secrecy of personal identifying information.
2.1. Minimizing Recurrences: Precautionary Guidelines173
(i) People are encouraged to request and use password-protected credit cards, and
bank and phone accounts. To avoid using easily available information like their
mother’s maiden name, their birth date, the last four digits of their SSN, their phone
number, or a series of consecutive numbers.
(ii) People must refrain from giving out their personal information on the phone,
through emails, or over the Internet unless they have initiated the communication or
are sure they know who they are dealing with. Identity thieves are clever, and have
posed as representatives of banks, Internet service providers (ISPs), and even
government agencies to get people to reveal their SSN, mother’s maiden name,
account numbers, and other identifying information. Before consumers share any
personal information, they must confirm that they are dealing with a legitimate
organization.
                                                 
172 In many cases, black markets are set up to facilitate the sale or trade of “hacker tools,” or tools used by
identity thieves in the commission of cybercime.
173 See the FTC 2004 Report.
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(iii) People should be careful when storing their financial records, birth date, and bank
account numbers on their computer, and should ensure that virus protection software
should be updated regularly,174 and patches for the operating system and other
software programs should be installed to protect against intrusions and infections that
can lead to the compromise of their computer files or passwords. Ideally, virus
protection software should be set to automatically update each week.
(iv) People are recommended to use firewall programs, especially if they use a high-
speed Internet connection like cable, DSL that leaves their computer connected to
the Internet 24 hours a day. The firewall program will allow them to stop uninvited
and unauthorized access to their computer.
(v) It is advisable not to open files sent from an unknown source or a stranger, or
click on hyperlinks or download programs from untrustworthy sources. People should
be careful about using file-sharing programs. Opening a file could expose their
system to a computer virus or a program known as “spyware”, which could capture
their passwords or any other information as they type it.175
(vi) Consumers and businesses are encouraged to use a secure browser and
encryption software when entering into online transactions or sending their personal
information to trusted sites.  Examples of the encryption technologies used to ensure
the security and confidentiality of email and web-based communications are Secure
Multipurpose Internet Mail Exchange Protocol (S/MIME) and Pretty Good Privacy
(PGP) for e-mails and Secure Sockets Layer technology (SSL) and Secure Hypertext
Transfer Protocol (S-HTTP) for web-based communications.  Both S/MIME and PGP
are powerful cryptographic products that guarantee both privacy and authentication.
Even if the information is intercepted, it remains completely unreadable.  As regards
SSL and S-HTTP, whilst the former creates a secure connection between a client
and a server and has the added feature of being able to encrypt all data passed
between the client and the server, including data at the Internet Protocol (IP) level,
the latter only encrypts HTTP-level messages and is designed to transmit individual
messages securely. Thus, both could be seen as complementary rather than
competing technologies.
                                                 
174 The term computer virus was formally defined by Fred COHEN in 1984, while he was performing academic
experiments on a Digital Equipment Corporation VAX computer system. Fred Cohen is best known as the
inventor of computer viruses and virus defence techniques. A computer virus is a specific type of malicious code
that replicates itself and inserts copies or new versions of itself in other programmes, when it is executed with
the infected program. It replaces an instruction in the target program with an instruction to transfer control to the
virus which is stored in the memory. Whenever the program transfer instruction is executed, it dutifully transfers
control to the virus program, which then executes the replaced instructions and performs its work of inserting
itself in other programs. There are presently more than 10,000 identified viruses affect the PC and Apple
operating systems. In addition, a few viruses affect other operating systems such as UNIX. There are, however,
no known viruses that attack the large-scale mainframe computer operating systems. There are, however, no
known viruses that attack the large-scale mainframe computer operating systems. This probably because the
virus makers have easy access to the desk top and laptop computing environments, and because of the
proliferation and casual exchange of software for these environments. On this point see experiments with
computer virus. Available at <http://all.net/books/virus/part5.html> (visited 03/10/2005).
175 See P2P File Sharing, available at <http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/alerts/sharealrt.htm> (visited
03/10/2005), also see Spyware, available at <http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/alerts/spywarealrt.htm>
(visited 03/10/2005).
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(vii) Before disposing of a computer, people must delete all stored personal
information and format their hard drive. Nevertheless, deleting files or reformatting
the hard drive may not be enough because the files could still be retrieved from the
computer’s hard drive. Thus, a “wipe” utility program could be used to overwrite the
entire hard drive.
(viii) Accounts’ passwords should not be disclosed to anyone, as accounts can be
hijacked, and people can find unexpected charges on their bills and statements.
(ix) Finally, beware of phishing, spoofing, spam attempts by being diligent, prudent,
and sceptical about suspicious communications.
2.2. Utilizing State-of-the-Art Technologies:
As previously mentioned, the sharp and rough edges of technology should be
mitigated and ICTs should be harnessed to combat the ills of modern technology.
ICT applications are in a constant state of flux and advancement in the field is
progressing at an accelerated pace that is difficult to trace. On such a basis, it is
always advisable to upgrade and implement top-notch latest technologies to
safeguard privacy and personal identifying information against identity theft and
cybercrime.
The current state of affairs reveal that top high-tech technologies utilized for security
purposes include: biometric applications, tokens, padded cells, cryptography and
digital signature technologies etc…
2.2.1 Biometric Security Solutions
Biometrics,176 is the study of measurable biological characteristics. In computer
security, biometrics refers to authentication177 techniques that rely on measurable
physical characteristics that can be automatically checked. There are several types
of biometric identification schemes:178
• face: the analysis of facial characteristics
                                                 
176 The term biometics is derived from the Greek words bio (life) and metric ((to measure). Among the first
known examples of practised biometrics was a form of member printing used in China in the fourteenth century,
as reported by the Portuguese historian Joao de Barros. The Chinese merchants were stamping children’s palm
and footprints on paper with ink to distinguish the babies from one another. In the 1890s an anthropologist and
police desk clerk in Paris named Alphonse Bertillon sought to fix the problem of identified convicted criminals
and turned biometrics into a distinct field of study. He developed a method of multiple body measurements that
was named after him (the Bertillonage technique – measuring body length. See J. CHIRILLO, Implementing
Biometric Security (N.Y., Wiley), [2003], p.1; For a brief study on how Finger-Scan technology works, see S.
NANAVATI, Biometrics: Identity Verification in a Networked World (N.Y., John Wiley), [2002], p. 48.
177 Authentication is the process whereby an entity verifies that the claimed identity of another entity is its true
identity. For applications involving computers and telecommunications, this is done for the purpose of
performing trusted communications between them. We distinguish between machine-by-machine authentication
(or simply, machine authentication) and human-by-machine authentication (or simply, human authentication).
See L. GORMAN, op. cit. p. 3.
178 Authenticator types can be combined to reap benefits in security or convenience or both. This is commonly
called, multi-factor authentication. A common multi-factor authenticator is an ATM card, which combines a
token with a secret (PIN). If a user has difficulty remembering the secret, a token may be combined with a
biometric. The photo-ID is the traditional 2-factor ID plus biometric. Rarely is a secret combined with a
biometric ID, since the objective is usually to get rid of the task of memorizing the secret. There has not been
much application for 3-factor authentication.
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• fingerprint: the analysis of an individual’s unique fingerprints
• hand geometry: the analysis of the shape of the hand and the length of the
fingers
• retina: the analysis of the capillary vessels located at the back of the eye
• iris: the analysis of the colored ring that surrounds the eye’s pupil
• signature: the analysis of the way a person signs his name.
• vein: the analysis of pattern of veins in the back if the hand and the wrist
• voice: the analysis of the tone, pitch, cadence and frequency of a person’s
voice.
Though the field is not yet entirely developed, many scholars and scientists believe
that biometrics will play a critical role in the future of security and especially in
electronic commerce.179
Biometric can provide a greater degree of security than traditional authentication
methods, meaning that resources are accessible only to authorise users and are kept
protected from unauthorised access.180
Because biometrics are difficult if not impossible to forget, they can offer much
greater convenience than systems based on remembering multiple passwords, or on
keeping possession of an authentication token.181
For computer applications in which a user must access multiple resources,
biometrics can greatly simplify the authentication process – the biometric replaces
multiple passwords, in theory reducing the burden on both the user and the system
administrator.
Applications such as point-of-sale transactions have also begun to see the use of
biometrics to authorise purchases from prefunded accounts, eliminating the need for
cards.182 Moreover, biometric authentication allows for association of higher levels of
rights and privileges with a successful authentication. Highly sensitive information
can more readily be made available on biometrically protected network than on one
protected by passwords.183
                                                 
179 The Hong Kong government began to issue identity cards several years ago and has been successful with its
program. It is a “smart” card with an embedded silicon chip that performs data storage and computational
functions.
See, Rina CHUNG, Hong Kong’s ‘Smart’ Identity Card: Data Privacy Issues and Implications for a Post-
September 11th America ( 4 A -P . L. & P  J.), 519, 531 [2003].
180 See S. NANAVATI, op. cit. p. 4.
181 The password has been the standard for computer network access for decades. If the system employs some
secure challenge-response password transmission protocol [20, 21] and limits the number of failed
authentication attempts (as most systems should), it will be resistant to most attacks. Since passwords can be
lent, this choice does not offer non- repudiation. Nor does it offer compromise detection. Password maintenance
is straight forward, however it may be costly when passwords are forgotten, especially if system policy
mandates good, non-dictionary passwords and frequent changes. A commonly quoted cost for each instance of
password reset is $30-$50. The problem with a password-only system is that people either forget their
password, incurring maintenance costs, or they choose a memorable password, which might also be guessable
and that weakens the security of the system. A password plus token combination is the more secure choice for
authenticating network access. The penalty is an increased system cost for the token, reader, and system
software. There is a convenience cost for the user as well because she still has to remember a password for the
token and also has to remember to carry the token. See L. GORMAN, op. cit. p. 19.
182 See S. NANAVATI, op. cit. p. 4.
183 Id.
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Finally, the potential application of biometric technology for the prevention of identity
theft is infinite. Any situation that allows for an interaction between man and machine
is capable of incorporating biometrics. The benefits of biometrics will make the use of
technology, and consequently, its acceptance, inevitable.184
Despite the real and actual benefits of biometric applications to both business and
consumers in relation to identity theft, public acceptance of biometrics is not
necessarily inevitable. It will only ensue if the privacy and trust concerns associated
with technology are effectively addressed.
Whether biometrics are privacy’s friend or foe, it is entirely dependent upon how the
systems are designed and how the information is managed. While the biometric
industry has made some positive initial steps, without private sector data protection
legislation, companies are still free to use biometric data without restriction.185 It must
be recognized that the use of biometrics needs to conform to the standards and
expectations of a privacy-minded society. The responsibility to ensure that this new
technology does not knowingly or unknowingly compromise consumer privacy lies
not only with businesses, but also with consumers186. Businesses must acknowledge
and accept their obligation to protect their customers’ privacy. Prior to introducing any
biometric system, the impact that such an application may have on consumer privacy
should be fully assessed. To appropriately and effectively balance the use of
biometric information for legitimate business purposes with the consumer’s right to
privacy; companies should adopt and implement the fair information practices and
requirements discussed in this article. Voluntary adoption of such practices is
essential if there is to be meaningful privacy protection of consumers’ biometric data
in the private sector.187
                                                 
184 See J. VACCA, Biometric Security Solutions (London, Prentice Hall), [2002].
185 Id.
186 Legislations against infringements of privacy have been adopted in most European countries with data
protection laws of more or less general character. An analysis of these acts shows that different international
actions have already achieved a considerable uniformity in the general administrative and civil law regulations of
the national privacy laws. In spite of this tendency, some differences in these regulations can be remarked. These
differences concern the legislative rationale, the scope of application, the procedural requirements for starting the
processing of personal data, the substantive requirements for processing personal data, and finally the respective
control institutions. On such a basis a comparative analysis to the protection privacy will distinguish four main
categories of criminal privacy infringements, which can in particular be found in the European privacy laws:
infringements of substantive privacy rights (a), infringements against formal legal requirements (b),
infringements of access rights (c), and neglect of security measures (d). The category of “crimes against privacy”
is constituted by infringements of substantive privacy rights and includes the following offences: The illegal
entering, modification, and/or falsification of data with the intent to cause damage ; The storage of incorrect
data. This act in most countries is covered by the general offences of information and in some countries by
additional statutes within the privacy laws ; The illegal disclosure, dissemination, obtainment of and/or access to
data, acts which are covered in most laws, however, to different extents; The unlawful use of data. However, as a
result of the uncertainties of the substantive provisions, many legal systems rely to a great extent on an additional
group of offences against formal legal requirements or orders of supervisory agencies. The formal offences
against supervisory agencies and regulations which are, furthermore, included in most privacy laws contain in
general more precise descriptions of the prohibited acts than the substantive offences. These formal provisions
also vary considerably within the national legislation. The differences among the formal offences are not only
based on differences in administrative law concerning the existence, nature, and powers of supervisory agencies,
and the respective duties of the data processors. They are mainly evoked by different answers to the fundamental
question whether “formal” offences should be regarded as criminal or not. This leads to the fact that some
countries, such as France, punish formal offences against supervisory agencies and regulations with severe
criminal sanctions, while others, such as Germany, regard such acts as “Ordnungswidrigkeiten”, or “petty
offences”, only punishable by fines.
187 See J. VACCA, Biometric Security Solutions (London, Prentice Hall), [2002].
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Consumers need to advocate for their own privacy rights. They can make a
difference by only doing business with companies that follow fair information
practices; and, that make use of the privacy-enhancing aspects of biometrics in the
design of their information management systems and ID theft protection techniques.
Consumer preferences will be key in defining the appropriate uses and protection of
biometrics. Consumers have the power -- they need to use it wisely188.
2.2.2 Honey Pot Decoys and Padded Cells
The anonymity of the Internet that allows identity thieves to hide conceal their true
identity so effectively can be a double-edged sword used against them.189
In his book The Cuckoo’s Egg, Cliff Stoll describes how he effectively used decoy
data files with exotic names to lure prey to his hacker-attacked computer. This type of
enticement is generally referred to as a “honey pot” or “padded cell”. The technique
involves setting up a dummy server on the network and assigning an intriguing name,
then loading a security information program into it along with a few nonsense data
files, a copy of an important application program, and a pager service.190 Because
there should be no reason for anybody to use the server when the pager calls to
indicate unauthorized use, you can begin a trace to identify the source of intrusion.
In many cases, the hits will be accidental, but if you identify one real intruder among
one hundred false alarms, the honey pot may be well worth its modest cost. Law
enforcement agencies are using this technique with increasing effectiveness to catch
identity thieves online.191
However, there is a drawback to this technique, as network users will discover the
honey pot, and its effectiveness will be diminished. Alternatively, they may use it for
spoofing you with false attacks. You may wish to inform your trusted, legitimate users
about the subterfuge with the intent of catching intruders, or you may wish to run a
honey pot for a short period of time, then replace it with a new one with a different
identity.
2.2.3 Tokens
No matter how secure a password system is, a clever identity thief can beat it. That is
why many system owners now require use of tokens along with passwords. A token
is a hardware or software device carried by, or in possession of, a computer user.192
The token contain an electronically recorded and encrypted password. Alternatively,
it may have an on-board processor that can store and retrieve such a password
when needed.193 A token may be a plastic “smart card” similar to a credit card, or a
program stored on a diskette; mobile computers or pocket calculators may also be
tokens if they generate passwords.
There are two categories of tokens:194
• Passive or Stored Value, e.g., bank card;
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• Active, e.g., one-time password generator.
The passive storage device is usually a magnetic stripe or smart card in which a
static code word is stored. The active device usually contains a processor that
computes a one-time password, either by time-synchronization or challenge-
response. Some active tokens can also perform cryptographic calculations to encrypt
and decrypt.195 A smart card can participate in challenge-response protocols from the
authenticating server by virtue of a cryptographic processor on the card.
Active tokens are higher end “secure” smart cards having a cryptographic
processor.However, if they only store passwords or code words, but cannot perform
processing functions, they are passive devices.
The primary advantage of tokens is their security. As they can store or generate a
code word much longer than that which a human can remember, they are much less
easily attacked.196 A token that yields a 12-digit codeword has 10 possible different
code words. This is called its key space and it is advantageous that the key space be
as large as possible to minimize or dispense with successful attacks.
However most users are not usually so diligent in their password selection and
average password key space is around 10. Therefore, in the average case a token is
more secure than a password as measured by key space.
Another advantage of a token is that it provides compromise detection. Unlike a
password which if stolen the legitimate user might have no idea, if a token is stolen,
its owner has evidence of this fact by its absence.197
A final advantage is that it prevents denial of service attacks. Whereas an attacker
with knowledge of a user’s login can make a number (usually three) of login attempts
with incorrect passwords until the system freezes that account, the attacker cannot
achieve this if a token were required.
On a different note, there exist three main drawbacks to security tokens:198
• The user must remember to physically possess it to authenticate.
• Most security tokens require the user to memorize a PIN, so this
effectively adds the memorization drawback as for passwords.
• Most tokens require a port or reader to convey information to the
machine, for instance a smart card reader, USB port, etc. These may not
be widely available or available across different access modes such as
computers and telephones.
2.2.4. Cryptography
Although encryption is probably best known for protecting information from identity
thieves, this application is probably overrated in business because of the colourful
history of espionage, military and diplomatic concerns.199
Cryptography has a variety of purposes and requires different kinds of key
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management for its three applications in communications, storage, and digital
signatures.200
In communications, communicators use cryptography to protect information in transit
when it is particularly vulnerable (i.e., going through the cyberspace) because the
senders and receivers typically do not have control over the communication route.201
This application requires short-term protection by encrypting the information before it
is sent, and decrypting it upon arrival. Sender’s systems may generate keys or
receive keys from the intended receiver for short-term use.
The challenge is for the sender’s and receiver’s systems to securely exchange and
coordinate use of the keys, ensuring that no unauthorised party could change the
senders key or has possession of the decryption key required to decrypt the
information.202
In storage, possessors of information require several different methods to store
information securely. Storing encrypted information requires the secure storage,
backup, and retrieval of keys and cryptographic mechanisms – presumably in ways
that are subject to better protection than the stored plaintext information.203
This presents a potential adversary with a twofold challenge: obtaining the keys and
mechanisms and obtaining the ciphertext. The authorised decryptors must be able to
securely retrieve the keys and mechanisms, possibly after long periods of time.
Obviously, key and mechanism security is crucial to effective use of cryptography.
The strength of the cryptography algorithm is of little importance at or above a
prudent level.204
Much of literature on cryptography emphasizes the need for key management, but
often omits mention of the important preservation of the mechanisms as well. Without
the mechanisms, or at least possession of the algorithms used, it is virtually
impossible to retrieve the plaintext, even if you do possess the keys.
In digital signatures, in order for digital signatures to be effectively a functional
equivalent to handwritten signatures, cryptography is used to ensure the authenticity
and integrity of signatures, documents, and transactions.205 The cryptographic
application accomplishes this by including a checksum or hash total of the entire
message in the signature before it is encrypted. A new business function, called
certificate authorities or trusted third parties, is emerging to create and provide
authentic digital signatures for people to use in electronic communications and
transactions.206
3. Digital Signatures with PKI Technology
Digital signatures may be considered more complex than biometrics.207 in this
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context, it should be stated in the outset that digital signatures are quite distinct, from a
technical stance, from electronic signatures which may be considered an electronic
reverberation of handwritten signatures.208
In its true essence, a digital signature uses encryption and alogarithm based on
certain technologies such as Public Key Infrastructure, or “PKI.” The first step in
utilizing this technology is to create a public-private key pair; the private key will be
kept in confidence by the sender, but the public key will be available online. The
second step is for the sender to digitally “sign” the message by creating a unique
digest (hashing) of the message and encrypting it.209
The third step is to attach the digital signature to the message and to send both to the
recipient.
The fourth step is for the recipient to decrypt the digital signature by using the
sender’s public key. If decryption is possible, the recipient knows the message is
authentic, i.e., that it came from the purported sender.210
Finally, the recipient will create a second message digest of the communication and
compare it to the decrypted message digest; if they match, the recipient knows the
message has not been altered. Thus, PKI technology verifies and authenticates the
source of a message and its contents.211
4. Future Trends
Time plays a critical role in advancement and progression, and in the field of
information technology there is always room for improvement and progress at an
accelerated rate, especially with respect to authentication, cryptography, and privacy
enhancing systems. However, the challenge, in effect, lies in striking the right
balance between simplicity and convenience on one hand, and maximum security on
the other hand.
Amongst the current pilot and ongoing projects for the provision of a higher level of
security that minizes the risk of identity theft and cybercrime are:212
• Graphical passwords which claim to be more memorable to users. The
Déjà vu project at the University of California at Berkeley, 213 displays an
array of abstract images to users and focuses on the ones memorized.
Similarly, the HumanAut project at Carnegie Mellon University requires the
user to choose the pictures he/she has memorized from a sequence of
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images.
Furthermore, the Draw-a-Secret project at Bell Labs, AT&T Labs, and NYU
requires the user to draw a line in the same shape and sequence within an
invisible grid pattern.214
• Enhanced tokens include multi-function smart cards that store multiple
passwords on a single token and can perform other tasks, such as
employee identification (employee identity card) or cafeteria debit. For
wireless convenience, new security tokens will contain a Radio Frequency
Identification tags (RFID) or Bluetooth chip, both for wireless detection in
the proximity of a reader.215 PDAs will also be enhanced with hardware
and software to securely store passwords and other secure or private
information.
• New and Multi-modal biometrics attempt to address some of the
shortcomings of current biometric solutions. Multi-modal biometrics
combine different biometric modalities to strengthen security, reduce false
rejections, and provide alternatives to the user. New biometrics include
gait recognition, infrared capture of blood vessel patterns, and implantable
chips.216
5. Culture-Oriented Strategy: Public Awareness and Training on
Security Issues
It should be stated in the outset that the best security policies in the world will be
ineffective and worthless if users are not aware of them, able to use them, or if the
policies are inconveniently restrictive. Policies that are unenforceable, or those which
users are not willing to enforce are futile; their existence undermines the credibility of
the system as a whole.
Moreover, transparency is a key factor of success. This entails full transparency on
the efficiency of such policies, their scope, any restrictions or exceptions should be
clear and explicit..
By and large, a culture of awareness, training, and transparency with respect to
security issues and applications should be developed between all stakeholders to
minimize the risks associated with cyber-communications.
CONCLUSION
This article aimed to explore and critically analyze the risk of identity theft in
cyberspace. In the outset it should be noted that there is an direct relationship
between the development and evolution of ICTs and Internet-related applications,
and the intensification of identity theft risks and applications.
Technology is truly a double-edged sword that has transformed the classical and
traditional forms of criminal behaviour. The proliferation of ICTs and progressive
development in digital transactions and communications has created new
opportunities and opened up new windows for the illicit exploitation and utilization of
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ICTs, which has resulted in the emergence of new forms of criminal behaviour and
cybercrime. On such a basis, cyberspace identity theft ranks amongst the most
important and virulent forms of cybercrime; not only due to its adverse impact on the
development of cyberspace and e-commerce but also due to the diversity of means
and methods that could be utilized in committing this crime as well as the inherent
risk of using identity theft as a leeway and instrument to commit other crimes using
the stolen identities of victims. Furthermore, identity theft could have a devastating
impact on the financial security and credit scoring of victims.
 Being aware of the potential and actual risks associated with this serious exploitation
of ICTs, the authors have, throughout this article, attempted to provide a
comprehensive overview of the fundamental issues and potential solutions pertinent
to this form of criminal behaviour.
On such account, the article has been divided into two main parts: the first addressed
the threat of identity theft by analyzing the threats associated, harms caused, factors
contributing to the occurrence of the crime, the sort of information that could be
stolen and attractive for identity theft offenders, the diverse mechanisms and
methods utilized by offenders in committing this abhorrent crime (such as hacking,
spoofing, phishing and pharming, spyware and malicious applications etc…), and the
potential use of stolen information and personal data.
The second part of the article focused on the potential solutions to identity theft in
cyberspace and devised a three-fold scheme based on the necessity for: (a)
establishing adequate and efficient regulatory, strategic and legislative policies that
protect online privacy and penalize cyber-criminal activities on national, regional, and
global levels; (b) adopting technology-based solutions that enhance information
security and protect online privacy. The need for adopting state-of-the-art technology
to provide adequate information security was emphasized with respect to biometric
security applications, tokens, honey pot decoys, cryptography and digital signatures,
and graphical passwords; (c) developing cultural awareness and devising training
programmes that raise public awareness and prudent practices in online activities.
By and large, the current article, by tackling the problem of identity theft in
cyberspace, presents a modest contribution to the field of cybercrime and information
security.
